International humanitarian law violations occurring within the occupied Palestinian territories during the years 1982-2012 by Desai, Thakira
University of the Western Cape 
Faculty of Law 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW VIOLATIONS OCCURRING  
WITHIN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 
DURING THE YEARS 1982-2012 
 
Mini-thesis submitted in partial fulfilment 
 of the requirements for the M.Phil degree 
By 
Thakira Desai 
(Student Number: 2831418) 
 
Supervisor: Professor L van der Poll 
Date: November 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
First and foremost, my gratitude goes to the Almighty for the protection and guidance 
during the completion of this program.  
Secondly, my sincere appreciation goes to my supervisor, Professor Letetia van der 
Poll, who has meticulously assisted me in improving the quality of this research 
paper.  
A special thank you to my mother, Fatima Desai, and my husband, Mohamed Saleem 
Jaffer, who have stood by me through each step of this Master’s program.  
This mini-thesis is dedicated to Mariam Ebrahim, my dear friend and an ex-student of 
UWC, who passed away 8 December 2013. Though not having completed her degree, 
having fallen ill with cancer, her strength and perseverance will forever be a reminder 
for me to never give up. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
CONTENTS 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................................................... 5 
KEY WORDS ....................................................................................................................................... 7 
CHAPTER 1 ......................................................................................................................................... 8 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................. 8 
1.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 8 
1.1.1 THE EXISTENCE OF AN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT .......................................................... 8 
1.1.2 THE ISRAELI OCCUPIED TERRITORIES ..................................................................................... 9 
1.1.3 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY ............................................................................................... 9 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT ................................................................................................ 13 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTION ................................................................................................. 13 
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH ................................................................................... 13 
1.5 ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................. 14 
1.6 LITERATURE REVIEW .................................................................................................. 14 
1.7 METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................................ 19 
1.8 CHAPTER OUTLINE ..................................................................................................... 20 
CHAPTER 2 ....................................................................................................................................... 22 
BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT ..................................................................................................... 22 
2.1 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... 22 
2.2 BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT ................................................................................... 22 
2.2.1 THE RISE OF ZIONISM ....................................................................................................... 22 
2.2.2 THE PARTITION OF THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES ................................................. 23 
2.2.2.1 The Belfour Declaration ........................................................................................... 23 
2.2.2.2 The UN Partition Plan ............................................................................................... 24 
2.2.2.3 The 1967 War ........................................................................................................... 26 
2.3. SYNOPSIS OF THE DIVIDING LINES BETWEEN ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN TERRITORY ................... 27 
2.3.1 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WEST BANK .............................................................................. 27 
2.3.2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE GAZA STRIP .............................................................................. 28 
2.3.3 THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE GAZA STRIP AND THE WEST BANK ................................................. 31 
2.4 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................ 32 
CHAPTER 3 ....................................................................................................................................... 33 
THE DUTIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS . 33 
3.1 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... 33 
3.2 WHAT IS THE DUTY OF THE UN RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS IN AN INTERNATIONAL 
ARMED CONFLICT? ............................................................................................................. 33 
3.2.1 THE ROLE OF DISARMAMENT AND ARMS TRADE ...................................................................... 35 
3.3 HAS THE UN FULFILLED ITS OBLIGATIONS AS ENSHRINED WITHIN: .......................................... 36 
3.3.1 RESOLUTION 181 (II) ....................................................................................................... 36 
3.3.2 RESOLUTION 242 ............................................................................................................ 38 
3.3.3 THE OSLO ACCORDS ......................................................................................................... 39 
3.4 WHAT IS THE DUTY OF THE ICRC RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS CAUGHT 
WITHIN AN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT? ......................................................................... 42 
3.4.1 THE LEGAL BASIS FOR ICRC INTERVENTION .......................................................................... 44 
3.4.2 HAS THE ICRC UPHELD ITS DUTIES IN THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS IN THE ISRAELI/PALESTINIAN 
CONFLICT? .................................................................................................................................. 44 
 
 
 
 
 4 
3.5 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................ 48 
CHAPTER 4 ....................................................................................................................................... 49 
THE DUTIES OF THE OCCUPYING POWER ......................................................................................... 49 
4.1 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... 49 
4.2 WHAT IS THE DUTY OF THE OCCUPYING POWER AS STATED IN THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION 
RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR? .......................................... 50 
4.2.1 ISRAEL’S POSITION WITH REGARDS TO ITS DUTY AS OCCUPYING POWER ..................................... 53 
4.3 WHAT ARE THE RIGHTS OF THE OCCUPIED CIVILIANS AS STATED BY THE FOURTH GENEVA 
CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR? ........................ 56 
4.4 APPROPRIATE MEANS THAT MAY AID IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION .......................................... 57 
4.4.1 APPROACHING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT ........................................................... 57 
4.4.2 INCREASED ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ..................................................................................... 59 
4.4.2.1 Effectiveness of sanctions ........................................................................................ 61 
4.4.3 INCREASED PRESSURE ON EGYPT ........................................................................................ 62 
4.4.3.1 The Exporting of Natural Gas to Israel ..................................................................... 65 
4.4.3.1 The Exporting of Natural Gas to Israel ..................................................................... 66 
4.4.3.2 The Role of the Suez Canal ....................................................................................... 67 
4.5 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................ 68 
CHAPTER 5 ....................................................................................................................................... 70 
IHL VIOLATIONS WITHIN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES ............................................... 70 
5.1 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... 70 
5.2 ACTIONS AGAINST CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN OBJECTS THAT ARE IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE FOURTH 
GENEVA CONVENTIONS ....................................................................................................... 71 
5.2.1 ILLEGAL ARRESTS ............................................................................................................. 71 
5.2.1.1 Illegal Arrest of Minors............................................................................................. 72 
5.2.1.2 Prolonged Periods of Detention .............................................................................. 74 
5.2.2 DEMOLITION OF HOMES ................................................................................................... 76 
5.2.2.1 Demolition as a Means to Colonisation ................................................................... 78 
5.2.3 RESTRICTED ACCESS TO BASIC NEEDS .................................................................................. 81 
5.2.4 TORTURE ........................................................................................................................ 82 
5.2.4.1 Restricted Access to Basic Needs as a Means of Torture ........................................ 83 
5.2.5 THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE WALL ..................................................................................... 84 
5.2.5.1 The ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on the Construction of the Wall ................................... 85 
5.2.5.2 Israel’s Justification for the Wall .............................................................................. 89 
5.2.5.3 Psychological Effects of the Wall ............................................................................. 90 
5.3 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................ 94 
CHAPTER 6 ....................................................................................................................................... 95 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................................................... 95 
6.1 CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................................................... 95 
6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................................................. 97 
6.2.1 ADJUSTING THE PENAL LAWS OF ISRAEL IN ORDER TO RESPECT IHL AND IHRL .......................... 98 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................................... 102 
APPENDICES ................................................................................................................................... 118 
 
 
 
 
 5 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
AOA Independent Monitor for the Agreement on the Operational 
Arrangements  
BDS Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions 
CAT Convention Against Torture  
CESCR International Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
CoD Council of Delegates  
EMG East Mediterranean Gas 
EMS Emergency Medical Services  
GDP Gross Domestic Product  
GSS General Security Service  
HCJ High Court of Justice 
ICC International Criminal Court 
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  
ICERD International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination  
ICESCR International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
ICJ International Court of Justice  
ICRC  International Committee of the Red Cross 
IDF Israeli Defence Force 
IHL International Humanitarian Law 
IHRL International Human Rights Law 
 
 
 
 
 6 
ISA Israeli Security Agency  
MDA Magen David Adom in Israel  
MoD  Ministry of Defence  
MoU  Memorandum of Understanding  
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
OTP Office of the Protector 
PLO  Palestinian Liberation Organization  
PRCS Palestinian Red Crescent Society  
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights  
UN  The United Nations  
UNCAT United Nations Committee Against Torture  
UNRWA United Nations Relief and Works Agency  
USA  United States of America  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 7 
KEY WORDS 
 
 Armed Conflict 
 Civilian Persons 
 IHL 
 Israel 
 Occupied Territory 
 Palestine 
 Protection 
 Violations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 8 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction  
Chapter 1 provides an outline of the research. The Chapter establishes the existence of 
an international armed conflict and provides a background to the study. Importantly, 
this Chapter outlines the: problem statement; research question; significance of the 
research, literature review, and methodology. In conclusion, Chapter 1 provides a 
chapter outline for the succeeding five chapters.  
1.1.1 The existence of an international armed conflict 
 
Common Art 2 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 states that the Convention 
is to apply to all cases of declared war or armed conflict between two or more high-
ranking parties. The state of war does not have to be recognized by both parties. 
Furthermore, the state of war applies to cases of partial or total occupation of the 
territory of a high contracting party, even if the occupation is not met with armed 
resistance. The context of an international armed conflict is extended by Protocol I, 
Art 2, to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 to armed conflicts in which individuals are 
fighting against colonial domination, racist regimes, and (applicable to this current 
mini-thesis) alien occupation.
1
  
 
Within the context of the Israeli and Palestinian conflict, the conflict as prescribed by 
the Fourth Geneva Convention is of an international nature.
2
 Israel has since 1948 
taken over Palestinian land, thus both usurping territory, as well as acting as an alien 
occupant, therefore fulfilling both requirements of an international armed conflict. 
This has resulted in two Intifadas and many deaths.
3
 
 
 
                                                                
1
 UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (2011) ‘International Legal Protection of Human 
Rights in Armed Conflict’.   
2
 Paulus A and Vashakmadze M ‘Asymmetrical war and the notion of armed conflict- a tentative 
conceptualization’ (2009) 91 International Review of the Red Cross 873 111-115.  
3
 Hammami R and Salim T ‘The Second Uprising: end or new beginning?’ (2001) 30 Journal of 
Palestinian Studies 12-16. 
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1.1.2 The Israeli Occupied Territories 
 
At the start of the 1967 war Israel was in control of the following areas:  
 
The West Bank: The area of Samaria and Judea that lies between Israel proper
4
 
and the river Jordan. This area was previously under Jordanian 
rule and was granted the singular title of ‘the West Bank ’ by 
the Israeli military government in December 1967.  
The Gaza Strip:  Though having made no claim over it, Egypt had managed the 
Gaza Strip from 1948 to 1967.  
East Jerusalem: Annexed on 30 June 1980, this area formed part of the West 
Bank.  
The Golan Heights: An area which today forms part of Syria.  
The Sinai Peninsula: Part of Egypt, this area came under Israeli control in the year 
1967. Israel began moving out of the Sinai Peninsula in 1974 
and 1975, and again in 1979 with the establishment of the 1979 
peace Treaty that made provision for the phased withdrawal of 
Israeli troops, to be completed on April 25, 1982.
5
  
1.1.3 Background to the study 
 
At the end of World War II, the preservation of human dignity had become an integral 
element of international law. International humanitarian Law (IHL) is a set of rules 
that seeks to limit the effects of armed conflict on civilians and combatants alike. This 
objective is outlined in two areas of concern, namely, the protection of persons, and 
the restrictions on the means and methods of warfare. IHL is framed within treaties 
and customary international law and are outlined within a multitude of conventions 
and protocols, inclusive of the four Geneva Conventions and their Additional 
Protocols and the Hague Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land considered binding on all states independently of their acceptance of them.
6
 In 
addition, international treaties dealing with the use and stockpiling of certain 
                                                                
4
 ‘Israel Proper’ refers to the territory of Israel prior to 1967. 
5
 Playfair E International Law And The Administration Of Occupied Territories: Two Decades Of Israeli 
Occupation Of The West Bank And Gaza Strip (1992).  
6
UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (2011) 12.  
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weapons, regulating the conduct of armed conflict, and subsequently imposing 
limitations on the use of certain weapons, are all considered part of IHL.  
 
The Third Geneva Convention stipulates the unique role played by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which includes the duty of the ICRC to visit 
prisoners, organize relief operations, and to contribute to family reunification both 
during international and non-international armed conflict.
7
 Furthermore, the ICRC 
enjoys the role of interpreting IHL, working towards its application within armed 
conflict, taking cognizance of breaches of IHL, including contributing to the overall 
understanding and development of the law.
8
   
 
IHL primarily addresses states parties to an armed conflict, imposing obligations on 
states, as well as their forces participating in the conflict. Furthermore, IHL extends 
responsibility directly to the parties to the conflict and the civilian leadership. State 
obligations are extended to the investigation of possible violations of IHL, and 
prosecuting and punishing offenders. These obligations imposed on states are to be 
observed in all situations, including those in which states delegate governmental 
functions to various individuals, groups and/or companies.
9
  
 
Under IHL the deliberate killing of combatants, who do not surrender, is not 
prohibited. It does however prohibit parties to the conflict from killing or injuring 
civilians, furthermore emphasizing the duty of combatants to prevent the accidental 
death of and injury to civilians.
10
 These directives therefore relay the need for 
recognition of violations against civilians, as well as examining the context in which 
violations had occurred. In examining the legality of an attack, three principles to be 
observed are established within IHL, namely: distinction; proportionality; and 
precaution. The objective of these principles is to establish and maintain respect for 
civilians and civilian structures.
11
  
 
                                                                
7
ICRC Newsletter (2004) ‘Protecting Persons Deprived of their Freedom is Necessary’ 2-6.  
8
 UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (2011) 14.  
9
 Geneva Convention ,1949 Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (1949).  
10
 Geneva Convention, 1977 Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions 13-14 (1977).  
11
 Henchaerts M ‘Study on Customary IHL’ (2005) International Review of the Red Cross 198-200.  
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The first principle, distinction, establishes the duty placed upon combatants to 
distinguish between combatants and civilians, with attacks only to be directed at 
combatants and military objectives. ‘Distinction’ is to be achieved with the use of 
distinctive uniforms and various forms of identification.
12
 The second principle, 
proportionality, maintains that initiating an attack expected to cause incidental loss of 
life and injury to civilians or civilian objects, excessive in nature as compared to a 
direct attack on military objectives, is prohibited.
13
 The third and final principle, 
precaution, establishes the duty of combatants to take special care in protecting the 
lives of civilians.
14
 It therefore emphasizes the need to prevent the deaths of civilians, 
and minimize the incidental loss of life and injury to civilians and civilian objects by 
verifying the nature of the object that is to be attacked. Importantly, assuring that the 
objective is in fact a military objective. Furthermore, providing a warning to civilians 
within the vicinity of an impending attack that subsequently provides ample time for 
evacuation of civilian populations.  
 
The Human Rights Committee in its General Comments No. 29 (2001) and No. 31 
(2004), states that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is 
applicable in cases of armed conflict, complementary to IHL.
15
 This is important, 
noting that the norms of jus cogens, or customary international law, prohibit 
derogation from certain rights as stipulated by Art 4 of the ICCPR. Rights, which are 
considered non-derogable, include: freedom from torture, freedom from slavery, 
genocide, racial discrimination, crimes against humanity, and the right to self-
determination.
16
 The Committee has further stated that a state may not arbitrarily 
arrest or detain individuals, and may not presume a person’s guilt without providing 
the right of a person to prove their innocence.
17
 Furthermore, the UN Convention 
against Torture (CAT) has addressed the issue of torture. Art 2 of the CAT specifies 
that all parties to the Convention are to take all necessary steps to prevent acts of 
                                                                
12
 Henchaerts M (2005) 198.  
13
 Henchaerts M (2005) 199.  
14
 Henchaerts M (2005) 199-200.  
15
De Zayas A ‘Human Rights and Indefinite Detention’ (2005) 87 International Review of the Red Cross 
18-22. 
16
 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 1966 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (1966) Art 4. 
17
 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 1966 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (1966) Art 4. 
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torture. A ‘state of war’ or ‘threat of war’, according to the CAT does not justify any 
form of torture.
18
 
 
For the purpose of this mini-thesis, a special focus will be placed on ‘crimes against 
humanity’ and ‘war crimes’. The definition of crimes against humanity is derived 
from the Rome Statute. The Rome Statute states that ‘crimes against humanity’ refers 
to any act when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack is directed 
against any civilian population.
19
 Crimes against humanity to be discussed include:  
 
‘Murder; extermination; deportation or forcible transfer of populations; imprisonment 
or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of 
international law; Torture; Persecution against any identifiable group or collectively 
on political; racial; national; ethnic; cultural; religious; gender; or other grounds that 
are universally recognized as impermissible under international law; in connection 
with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court; Enforced disappearance of persons;  the crime of apartheid;   and lastly, other 
inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious 
injury to body or to mental or physical health.’20 
The definition of ‘war crimes’ for the purpose of this mini-thesis is derived from the 
Rome Statute and is defined as ‘acts against persons or property protected under the 
Geneva Conventions’ that are in breach of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949.
21
 This mini-thesis will focus on the following war crimes:  
‘Torture or inhuman treatment; including biological experiments; willfully causing 
great suffering; or serious injury to body or health; extensive destruction and 
appropriation of property; not justified by military necessity and carried out 
unlawfully and wantonly; unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement.’22 
Furthermore, consideration will be given to Art 8(b) of the Rome Statute that asserts 
the duty of combatants to protect both civilians and civilian structures within armed 
                                                                
18
 UN General Assembly Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading  
Treatment or Punishment, 1987 United Nations Treaty Series 1465 2 (1987).  
19
 UN General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998 Art 7 (1). 
20
 Rome Statute (1998) Arts 7 (1a, b, d, e, f, h, I, j, k,). 
21
 Rome Statute (1998) Art 8 (2)a.  
22
 Rome Statute (1998) Arts 8 (2) a (I, ii, iii, iv, vi, vii, viii). 
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conflict.
23
 With regards to crimes against humanity, this mini-thesis will focus on the 
crimes of extermination and the crime of Apartheid.  
1.2 Problem Statement 
The purpose of this mini-thesis is to address IHL violations occurring within the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories  relative to the protection of civilian persons in time 
of war. Importantly, various IHL violations that occur within the Green Line will be 
expanded upon. The mini-thesis will shed light on the lack of international action, 
specifically the inaction of the UN and the ICRC, in ending the decades of IHL 
violations by both the Israeli and Palestinian forces. As a means to an end, further 
destruction of property and loss of life that inhibits the quality of life of Palestinians 
and Israeli citizens trapped within the ongoing conflict, this mini-thesis will 
endeavour to provide solutions to ending the occupation. These solutions include: a 
UN Resolution directed toward the demolition of the wall; establishing permanent 
means of access to all basic needs; and lastly, addressing the influence of The United 
States of America (USA) and Egypt, respectively.  
1.3 Research Question  
 
Have IHL violations relative to the protection of civilian persons occurred within the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories during the years 1982-2012?  
1.4 Significance of the Research 
 
A study focusing on IHL violations within the context of the Israeli/Palestinian armed 
conflict may shed light on the apparent lack of control which both states’ and various 
international bodies have in their attempts to broker a truce. It is also to address the 
need for increased international attention with regard to the quality of life of 
Palestinian and Israeli citizens caught within the armed conflict.  
 
The objective of this mini-thesis is to understand the purpose of the doctrine of IHL, 
and subsequent IHL violations, within the context of the Israeli/Palestine international 
armed conflict. This mini-thesis will focus on war crimes and crimes against 
humanity as defined by the Rome Statute. It will seek to understand the applicability 
                                                                
23
 Rome Statute (1998) Art 8(2) b. 
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of the Geneva Conventions, their Additional Protocols and the Rome Statute. 
Furthermore, it will attempt to understand the efficiency of both the Israeli and 
Palestinian forces in implementing the principles of distinction, proportionality, and 
precaution with regard to the protection of civilians and civilian property in the 
context of an armed conflict.  
 
As a member of the greater international community, witnessing daily atrocities 
carried out by regimes against their own, as well as foreign counterparts, it has 
become apparent that instruments established for the preservation and protection of 
civilians found within armed conflict situations are not made use of or may not be as 
efficient as may have been initially hoped. This mini-thesis therefore aims to 
understand the efficiency and applicability of IHL within the arena of the 
Israeli/Palestinian armed conflict.  With the objective of highlighting the 
shortcomings of the applicability of IHL and possibly improve the understanding and 
subsequent implementation of IHL within the context of an international armed 
conflict.  
1.5 Argument 
 
This mini-thesis will argue that IHL has been violated relative to the protection of 
civilian persons in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Furthermore, this mini-thesis 
will argue that the United Nations (UN) and its respective organs, the ICRC, and the 
international community at large have not fulfilled their duty to protect the rights of 
civilians caught within the armed conflict.  
1.6 Literature Review 
 
Berkowits, assessing the Goldstone Reports, asserts that Israel has implemented a 
policy that enforced the terrorization of Palestinian civilians. Israeli forces have 
targetted civilian non-combatants and civilian infrastructure, in contravention of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention.
24
 Furthermore, Stephen Zunes asserts that with the 
increased insurgency against the Palestinian population in Gaza in 2008,
25
 the USA 
Speaker of the House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, insisted: ‘When Israel is 
                                                                
24
 Geneva Convention, 1949 Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War  (1949). 
25
 Reidman P.A ‘West Bank struggle: A Call for Human Rights’ (2012) 17 Human Rights 1.   
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attacked, the United States must continue to stand strongly with its friend’. Various 
other members of Congress who deny that large-scale attacks against Palestinian 
civilians had taken place affirmed this sentiment. President Bush reinforced this 
sentiment. Zunes states the fact that the foreign policy by the USA was in 
contravention of IHL.
26
 
 
According to Weill, thousands of Palestinians have been judged in Israeli military 
courts.
27
 The first five of these was established in 1967 and were situated in Hebron, 
Nablus, Jenin, Jericho, and Ramallah. It has been recorded that between 1993 and 
2000, the period of the Oslo peace process, over 124 000 Palestinians were prosecuted 
within the Israeli military courts. Today only two courts are functioning, namely, the 
Court of Appeals, and the Court of First Instance. 
 
Consequently, Weill emphasizes IHL regulations with regard to Occupied Territories. 
The local legal system is to remain intact, as it was prior to occupation, thus reflecting 
the temporary nature of occupation. Importantly, Weill notes that the occupying 
power is not to be considered as the new sovereign of the territory.
28
 Civilian life 
should therefore be conducted in the same manner as it was prior to occupation, 
without the interference of the legal system of the occupying power.
29
 This is 
emphasized by Art 43 of the Hague Regulations, which imposes the obligation on 
occupying powers to ensure public order whilst respecting the legal system in 
existence prior to the occupation
30
. 
 
Art 64(1) of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 provides two exceptions to Art 
43 of the Hague Regulations. The occupying power may revoke local penal 
legislation if the local legal system is a threat to security or an obstacle to the 
application of the Convention.
31
 Furthermore, though the legislative capacities of the 
occupying power are very extensive and complex, ICRC Commentary 51 emphasizes 
                                                                
26
 Zunes S ‘The Gaza war, Congress and IHL’ (2010) 17 Middle East Policy 69-72.  
27
 Weill S ‘The Judicial Arm of the Occupation: the Israeli Military Courts in the Occupied Territories’ 
(2007) 89 International Review of the Red Cross 395-397. 
28
 Geneva Convention, 1949 Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War (1949) Art 64. 
29
 Weill S (2007) 397.  
30
 Sassoli M Art 43 of The Hague Regulations and Peace Operations in the Twenty-First Century (IHL 
Mini-thesis, University of Geneva, 2004) 2-4. 
31
Geneva Convention, 1949 Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War (1949) Art 64(1). 
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that these measures may not be used as a means to oppress the occupied population. 
This is emphasized through the analysis of the presence of border crossings that 
regulate the movement of Palestinians into territories deemed to be Israel territory. 
32
  
 
Reyes correctly notes that torture under interrogation does not specifically entail 
physical assault or pain, but may also pertain to severe psychological pain and 
suffering, affecting the senses and personality of the victim.
33
 This has been 
emphasized in the Istanbul Protocol, which states that the definition of torture does 
require the presence of visible scars, and therefore has severe consequences, affirming 
that the “absence of evidence is not the evidence of absence”.34 A popular method of 
psychological torture is solitary confinement, described by Reyes as confinement 
alone in a cell for days, with little environmental or social stimulation. This form of 
psychological torture is said to be the most difficult to withstand.
35
 This has been 
described by Grassian as follows:  
 
‘The mental disturbances among prisoners so detained … [include] … an agitated 
confusional state, characteristics of a florid delirium, [with] severe paranoid and 
hallucinatory features and also by intense agitation and random, impulsive, often self-
directed violence.’36  
 
Mills asserts that the UN Fact-Finding Mission, the Goldstone Report, concluded that: 
Art 5 crimes; crimes against humanity (Art 7) inclusive of persecution and 
intentionally causing great suffering; and war crimes (Art 8) have occurred within the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories. Furthermore, he emphasizes that war crimes relative 
to the Fourth Geneva Convention, inclusive of willful killing; attack on civilians; 
severe beatings of prisoners; and torture, have all taken place within the armed 
conflict between Israel and Palestine. This Mills correctly asserts may fail to obtain 
                                                                
32
Refer to appendix no.2 Weill S (2007) 395-397.  
33
 Reyes H ‘The Worst Scars are in the Mind: Psychological Torture’ (2007) International Review of the 
Red Cross 598-600. 
34
 Reyes H ‘The Worst Scars are in the Mind: Psychological Torture’ (2007) International Review of the 
Red Cross 598-600. 
35
 Reyes H (2007) 606-607.  
36
 Stuart G ‘Psychiatric effects of solitary confinement’ (2006) 22 Journal of Law and Policy 327–80. 
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the attention of the International Criminal Court (ICC) as the USA veto rights has 
previously proved to inhibit Security Council action against these violations.
37
  
 
Relating to the situation in Jerusalem, Ambassador Thalmann’s 38  mission has 
highlighted the increased control enjoyed by Israel over east Jerusalem. Ambassador 
Thalmann’s mission has importantly emphasizes the expansion of west Jerusalem by 
60 square kilometers since Israel has usurped control of east Jerusalem, which has in 
total exceeded 100 square kilometers.
39
 Furthermore, it is to be noted that of the 
70 000 people residing within east Jerusalem 28 000 (40 per cent) reside in the old 
city, whilst 42 000 (60 per cent) reside outside of the walls.
40
 
 
In Para 120 of the Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction 
of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories , the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) concluded that Israeli settlements constructed within the Occupied Territories 
are in breach of international law, and prohibited under Art 49(6) of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention.
41
 This has been reiterated by the UN Charter, Art 2(5), which 
prohibits the “use of force against territorial integrity”42 and is emphasized by General 
Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) which states that “no territorial acquisition 
resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognized as legal”.43  
 
 
 
 
                                                                
37
 Mills S’s ‘The Gaza conflict (2008-09) and the International Criminal Court’ Available at  
http://israelandpalestinediary.blogspot.com/2012/04/gaza-armed-conflict-2008-09-and.html 
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Annex 1 to the ICJ opinion, notes:  
‘Israel denies that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, both of which it has 
signed, are applicable to the Occupied Palestinian Territories. It asserts that 
humanitarian law is the protection granted in a conflict situation such as the one in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip, whereas human rights treaties were intended for the 
protection of citizens from their own Government in times of peace.’44 
The Court however recalled a previous judgment
45
 in which it asserts the principle 
that the protection of the ICCPR does not cease in conflict situations.
46
 The exception 
to this judgment is the rules of derogation as stipulated under Art 4 of the ICCPR.
47
 
The construction of the wall, the Court noted, establishes closed areas between the 
Green Line and the wall itself, creating enclaves imposing restrictions on the freedom 
of movement of Palestinians. The infringement of the freedom of movement 
enshrined within Art 12 of the ICCPR,
48
 and Art 35 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, consequently highlight contravention by Israel of Art 23 of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention, relating to the access to healthcare.
49
   
 
Scobbie correctly notes the court’s assertion that since Israel’s justification for the 
wall is a security measure, the wall should be considered a temporary measure.
50
 This 
would be due to the fact that the route of the wall trails through occupied territory. 
Part of the West Bank lies between the Green Line and the wall. The wall is therefore 
structured in such a way so as to include 80 per cent of Israeli settlements within 
occupied Palestine.
51
 This is in contravention of Art 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva 
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Convention.
52
 The Court further asserts that since the threat originates within the 
territory and not from an outside source Israel does not have the justification to 
invoke the Resolution s in support of its claim to the right to self-defence. 
53
 
 
Judge Buergenthal incorrectly asserts the admissibility of the use of Art 51 of the UN 
Charter by Israel.
54
 The Green Line accepted as the dividing line by the Court 
between Israel and Palestine, renders Palestine an external territory to Israel. The 
‘terrorist’ attacks, Buergenthal notes, stem from an external threat and not from an 
internal threat. These attacks, he asserts, should therefore provide Israel with the right 
to exercise its right to self-defence. Israel’s defence should however be consistent 
with the ‘legitimate exercise of the right’.55 Judge Buergenthal continues by noting 
the court’s inability to address the argument of compensation with regards to damage 
to Palestinian property. Making reference to the Secretary-General’s assertion of 
Israel’s position with regards to destroyed property in the course of the construction 
of the wall, he states: 
 
‘There is no change in ownership of the land; compensation is available for the use of 
land, crop yield or damage to the land; residents can petition the Supreme Court to 
halt or alter construction and there is no change in resident status.’56 
 
1.7 Methodology  
 
Subsequent to establishing this framework, the sources used in the compilation of this 
mini-thesis, include: the Fourth Geneva Convention; the Rome Statute; the ICCPR; 
and the CAT. Other sources to be used include: journal article which focus on the 
origins of these instruments, as well as journal Art which focus on the use of IHL, 
inclusive of case law. Furthermore, this mini-thesis will make use of primary and 
secondary research materials in establishing the occurrence of IHL violations within 
the Occupied Palestinian Territories. This mini-thesis will therefore make use of 
qualitative research, with a special focus on secondary sources. 
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1.8 Chapter Outline  
 
Chapter 2 provides a historic account of the conflict. Focussing on the various periods 
of annexation, it will highlight important events that led to the present day structure of 
the respective territories. In conclusion, Chapter 2 will aim to create a clear 
understanding of the various territorial divisions. In doing so this chapter includes an 
analysis of the UN Partition plan, the 1947-1949 War, and the 1967 War.  
 
Chapter 3 addresses the duty of the UN in the protection of civilians caught within an 
international armed conflict. It seeks to articulate the duties of the UN specific to 
civilians residing within the Green Line. This curtails unwrapping UN Resolution s 
181 (II) and 242, as well as the Oslo Accords. Chapter 3 concludes addressing the 
responsibility of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Importantly, 
Chapter 3 addresses the ICRC's inaction in calling to the attention of the international 
community the ongoing IHL violations within the Occupied Palestinian Territories.  
 
In Chapter 4 it is argued that Israel as an occupying state has not fulfilled its duty to 
protect the structures, as well as the quality of life of civilians residing within both 
Israeli and Palestinian territory. Subsequently, this chapter addresses the rights of the 
Palestinian citizens as protected persons residing within an occupied territory. In 
conclusion, Chapter 4 seeks to address the failure of the occupying power, as well as 
possible solutions to the conflict.  These solutions include: approaching the UN 
Security Council, approaching the ICC, increased economic sanctions against Israel, 
increased pressure by Egypt, and finally, increased pressure by the USA. 
 
Chapter 5 outlines the various IHL violations that have occurred within the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories. Focussing on only a selected few violations, Chapter 5 will 
argue that IHL has been completely disregarded, as well as the basic human rights 
enjoyed by all human beings.  In doing so, this chapter discusses: illegal arrests, 
prolonged periods of detention, demolition of homes, restricted access to basic needs, 
and torture. Importantly, Chapter 5 discusses: the construction of the wall, Israel's 
justification for the construction of the wall, international response to the construction 
of the wall, as well as the subsequent consequences with regards to the quality of life 
of civilians as a result of barrier. 
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As the concluding chapter, Chapter 6 argues that IHL violations relative to the 
protection of civilian persons have occurred within the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories between the years 1992-2012. Furthermore, this Chapter argues that the 
UN and its respective organs, the ICRC, and the international community at large 
have not fulfilled their duty to protect the rights of the civilians caught within the 
international armed conflict between Israeli and Palestinian forces. Importantly, 
Chapter 6 provides recommendations that are aimed at alleviating the continued 
suffering of those residing within the Occupied Territories.  
 
Chapter 2 will discuss the background of the conflict.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 22 
CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT 
2.1 Introduction 
 
A discussion of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict within any discipline could not be 
entered into without a clear understanding of the origin and subsequent stages through 
which the conflict has transformed. This Chapter therefore provides a historic account 
of the conflict. Focussing on the various periods of annexation, it will highlight 
important events that led to the present day structure of the respective territories. In 
conclusion, Chapter 2 will create a clear understanding of the various territorial 
divisions.  
2.2 Background to the Conflict  
 
2.2.1 The rise of Zionism 
 
Following the wrongful conviction in 1884 of a Jewish military officer, Alfred 
Dreyfus, Jews across Europe became aware that anti-Semitism had worsened. The 
belief that Jews would be safe residing within a sovereign Jewish nation led to the 
Zionist movement promoting the return of Jews to their historic homeland. This 
movement was later led by Theodore Herzl.
57
  At the first Zionist Congress in August 
1897, Herzl was named the first President of the Congress. The aim of the Zionists 
was clearly stated in the ‘Basle declaration’: ‘The aim of Zionism is to create for the 
Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law’.58 
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2.2.2 The Partition of the Occupied Palestinian Territories  
2.2.2.1 The Belfour Declaration  
 
During the First World War, Great Britain promised the independence of the Arab 
regions. The Arabs residing within the Levantine provinces of the Ottoman Empire 
were promised independence if they were to initiate a revolt against the Ottomans.
59
 
This pledge was enclosed in a series of letters between Sir Henry McMahon, who was 
at the time the British High Commissioner to Cairo, and the Sharif of Makah, King 
Hussein Ibn Ali. The areas included within the discussions were Lebanon, Iraq, 
Jordan, much of present day Syria, and Israel/Palestine. At the time of the 
negotiations Palestine was approximately 92 per cent Palestinian Arab.
60
 
 
In secret agreements Great Britain and France elected to divide the Arab nations 
among themselves with the close of the war. Negotiated under the ‘Syke-Picot 
Agreement’ Britain obtained Transjordan, Northern Arabia, Gaza, and parts of 
Mesopotamia, whilst France was granted the Syrian and Lebanese coast, Mosul, 
Aleppo, Cilicia, and Damascus. Palestine was however defined as being 
internationally administered ‘in consultation with Russia’. These negotiations did not 
however speak of the independence of the Arabs residing within these territories. 
61
 
 
A further promise made by Great Britain was respecting the territory of Palestine. In 
November 1917 the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Belfour, wrote a letter to Lord 
Rothschild, a well known Zionist figure in England. Commonly known as the Belfour 
Declaration, the letter stipulated that Britain was determined to establish a national 
home for Jewish people in the territory of Palestine. The Declaration made clear that: 
‘Nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing 
non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by 
Jews in any other country.’62  
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Following the First World War, the League of Nations granted Great Britain and 
France mandates over the Arab lands. Great Britain was granted the mandate for 
Palestine, and attached to the mandate were the terms of the Belfour Declaration. 
Under the administration of the British, European Jewish immigration thrived. 
Consequently the Jewish population of the Palestinian territory noticeably altered 
from 8 per cent in 1917 to 31 per cent by 1946, thus leading to Arab unrest as 
European mandates increased the Zionist threat to Arab independence. The 
McMahon-Hussein negotiations, the Sykes-Picot Agreement, and the Balfour 
Declaration have each respectively contributed to the reshaping of Palestine and the 
Middle East. 
63
 
 
By 1939 the threat of a second world war forced the British to initiate a partition plan 
of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states.
64
 The British ended their commitments under 
the Belfour declaration in the same year with the release of a White Paper. This new 
undertaking of the British was in direct contradiction to the Belfour Declaration. The 
White Paper, in contrast, supported the establishment of a Palestinian state. This new 
position of Great Britain came at a period when Jews were under threat from Nazism 
and therefore desperate to immigrate to Palestine. The goal of establishing an 
independent Jewish state became an essential element of Jewish identity and religious 
motivation. 
65
 
2.2.2.2 The UN Partition Plan 
 
Being granted control of ‘the administration of the territory of Palestine’ under the 
League of Nations, Great Britain found itself unable to control the surge of violence, 
with the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people at the foreground of the 
conflict.
66
 Despite Britain’s intention to develop a single state of Palestine, its policies 
committed toward a Jewish national home in Palestine and liberal Jewish immigration 
policies in the course of establishing the mandate increased civil unrest between Jews 
and Arabs. The eruption of conflict caused the British Peel Commission to 
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recommend the partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states, with the Arab state 
to be integrated into Transjordan.
67
 This proposed plan aggravated both the Zionists, 
who felt that the area granted to them was too small, as well as the Arabs, who felt 
that the British did not have the right to divide their territory. The British eventually 
abandoned this suggestion, rather exchanging the goal to ‘the establishment within ten 
years of an independent Palestine state’. 68 
 
It was only in 1947 that the British recommended the matter to the UN. The UN 
established a committee that was composed of delegates from 11 of its Member 
States. The committee was to evaluate the situation within the Palestinian territory in 
order to recommend a solution to the conflict. In August 1947 the committee 
recommended the partition of Palestine. This partition plan was to divide Palestine 
into three territories: a Jewish state; an Arab state; and the internationally 
administered area of Jerusalem.
69
 The plan was to come into force with the evacuation 
of British armed forces from the territory by no later than 1 October 1948. A 
transition period was then established which would allow each state the opportunity to 
develop interim governmental institutions. This time period also allowed for the 
international recognition of each state, as well as the declared commitment to protect 
religious sites and minority rights.  
 
Although Zionists officials accepted the plan, the Arabs rejected it, questioning the 
right of the UN to allocate the majority of their land to the Jews. In March1947 the 
Zionists claimed less than 7 per cent of the land, and ownership of only 5.66 per cent, 
representing less than one-third of the territory’s population.70 However, by a vote of 
33 to 13, with ten abstentions, the UN authorized the plan on 29 November 1947. On 
14 May 1948, the Zionist National Council established the state of Israel. The Zionist 
state now controlled the territory granted to it in the partition plan, as well as  territory 
gained through the conflict from the Palestinians after independence. As a result of 
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the conflict, in 1949, Israel had control of 80 per cent of Palestinian territory. After 
the conflict an estimated 500 000 to 800 000 Palestinians were left as refugees.
71
 
2.2.2.3 The 1967 War 
 
As a result of the occupation of Palestinian land by the state of Israel, the international 
community began to regard Palestine individually rather than communally, as the 
British mandate had envisioned. This was largely due to the invigorated sense of self-
determination of the people of Palestine. As refugees the Palestinians were entitled to 
either repatriation or compensation.
72
 
 
The Suez Crisis agreement of 1956-1957 set the stage for the impending Arab 
onslaught against Israel. The agreement required Israel to withdraw from the Sinai. 
This provided Israel with protection against any attacks from the territory of Egypt, 
the use of the straits of Tiran, and a promised peace Treaty in due time. The 
agreement explicitly made reference to the right of Israel to use force in the event that 
Egypt should use force in closing the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. As a public 
agreement between Egypt and Israel was not possible, the agreement was established 
privately. The terms of the agreement were only released as public statements.
73
 
When President Nasser of Egypt requested the withdrawal of United Nations 
personnel from the Sinai in 1967, Secretary-General U Thant complied without 
following the procedure set forth under his predecessor, Hammarskjold.  
 
President Nasser’s expulsion of peacekeeping troops and subsequent deployment of 
troops to the Straits of Tiran resulted in the closure of the route from the Red Sea to 
the Israeli port of Eilat, making the Six Day War inevitable. The USA, a feeling that 
their its effort in attaining Israeli agreement to departing from the Sinai was 
considerable, did not favour the decision of President Nasser. The USA consequently 
prepared, together with Great Britain, The Netherlands, Australia, and Iran, to send a 
convoy of merchant ships escorted by an allied naval flotilla in an attempt to re-open 
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the Straits of Tiran.  
74
 Egypt and Jordan consequently formed a military pact, which 
was followed by a combined Arab call for the destruction of Israel.  
 
On 5 June 1967, Egypt released attacks against Israel, later to be attacked by Syria 
along the mutual border. Jordan attacked Jewish Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv. Israel now 
found itself defending itself on all three fronts. Following the Six Day War, Israeli 
forces were deployed along the Suez Canal, the Jordan River and on the Golan 
Heights.
75
  
2.3. Synopsis of the Dividing lines Between Israeli and Palestinian Territory  
 
2.3.1 The development of the West Bank  
 
The West Bank is a relatively new name for the biblical names Judea and Samaria;  
the east bank of the Jordan river being the capital of Jordan, Amman, as well as  the 
traditional area of the Hashemite Kingdom. “The West Bank ” therefore became the 
title of the area under Jordanian rule that began in 1948. At the time of the conflict the 
West Bank, an area of approximately 6 000 square kilometers, was home to about 
850 000 people. Afraid that they may be separated from their families on the east 
bank, many fled to the east bank, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. With the end of the war, 
the Israeli government sought to establish a military government in the Occupied 
Territories. Since no training had been provided for this task, officers were forced to 
act according to their best judgment.
76
 
 
On 6 July 1967, a political advisor to the Samaria military command submitted a 
memorandum on the views of the population inhabiting the West Bank. He analyzed a 
possible solution that entailed the modification of a Palestinian state within the 
boundaries of the West Bank. His findings showed that the idea of a Palestinian state 
within the West Bank did not seem viable for the people. The two main reasons were 
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the lack of economic viability and the fact that the idea would not be accepted by any 
Arab state. The Palestinian population therefore rejected the memorandum. 
77
 
 
Various negotiations relating to the autonomy of the West Bank took place. The 
notion of a self-administered West Bank appealed to the Israeli defence force, as they 
would be dismissed of their duties to oversee the local population, whilst also creating 
hope that a new Arab-Israeli relationship may be established extending beyond the 
borders of the Occupied Palestinian Territories. A political solution also prevented the 
annexation of the West Bank by Israel, as had been done with Jerusalem. This would 
allow for an independent Palestine state territory in the West Bank. For the Israelis the 
idea of a locally administered West Bank solution meant that a totally independent 
Palestine state on the West Bank could be prevented. Israeli politicians therefore 
envisioned an integrated West Bank economy with Israel. It was therefore commonly 
understood that an Israeli administered West Bank would only escalate the violence. 
By December 1967 Minister of defence, Moshe Dayan, withdrew most Israeli 
functionaries out of the West Bank territories. 
78
 
 
2.3.2 The Development of the Gaza Strip 
 
Gaza, a tiny strip of land on the Mediterranean, is approximately 360 square miles of 
land. The southern border of the area is Egypt, and along with the rest of the territory 
is surrounded by a 25-foot fence that separates Gaza from Israel.
79
 With more than 9 
000 people per square mile, the territory of Gaza currently has the highest population 
density in the world. The recommendation of a partition plan made by the Peel 
Commission, creating Arab and Jewish states cited Nablus, Ramallah, Jericho, 
Hebron, Gaza, and Beersheba as, namely Arab sub-districts. The partition plan 
created a map of interconnected Arab and Jewish territories. This sentiment is 
emphasized in a remark made by a member of the British House of Lords, relating to 
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the new partition plan which he described as: ‘Entwined in an inimical embrace like 
two fighting serpents.’80  
 
The partition plan of 1947 made provision for a Jewish territory within the eastern 
part of the Gaza sub-district.
81
 The first Arab-Israeli war in 1948 provided Israel with 
an opportunity to negotiate with Egypt in an attempt to withdraw Egyptian troops 
from the Gaza Strip. With the adoption of the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Agreement 
the conflict came to a close. In terms of the agreement, Egypt retained control of the 
Gaza Strip. The control of the Gaza Strip by Egypt provided Palestinian Arabs with 
access to the sea and therefore became an important territory to gain.
82
  
 
In the Six Day War of 1967, Israel attempted by all means to frustrate the military 
campaign of the Egyptian forces. Strongly committed to its military campaign, Israel 
closed the Gaza Strip to Egyptian access. At the end of the conflict, Israeli forces 
found themselves in control of the Gaza Strip. The neglect of the Gaza Strip under 
Egyptian control left the area in economic and social turmoil. With the purpose of 
both improving the social and economic structure of the area, as well as  promoting its 
own security interests, Israel began the development of settlements. One of the main 
architects of the proposal was the Israeli general, Ariel Sharon. These settlements 
therefore reflected the extension of Israel’s future borders. The 1973 Yom Kippur 
War, in which Israel was attacked from the north and south by Egypt and Syria, 
respectively, increased Israeli security concerns. As a result, by 1977, roughly 17 
Israeli settlements were established between Egypt and the Gaza Strip acting as a 
defence against Egyptian attacks.
83
  
 
The 1979 Camp David peace accords between Egypt and Israel stipulated the 
withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Sinai. This however led to an increase in the 
number of settlements constructed within the Gaza Strip. The various settlements that 
were increasingly under construction within the Gaza Strip led many critics to 
question the initial security concerns of Israel. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 
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1992 established a new Israel position that was intended to alter the government’s 
settlement policy. This was emphasized in the Oslo Accords, as the talks considered 
the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip.
84
 The new stance of the Israeli 
government stemmed from the first two Intifadas or Palestinian resistance 
movements. Brought about through the continued construction, as well as  the 
increased military presence, Palestinian Arabs began their revolt in 1987. The death 
of six Palestinians thought to have been a revenge attack for the death of two Israelis 
within the Gaza Strip paved the road for the first Intifada. The uprising proved to 
Israeli forces that the Gaza Strip could be indefinitely under Israeli rule. The first 
Intifada came to an end in 1993.
85
  
 
The second Intifada commenced in 2000. As the Israeli and Palestinian peace process 
regressed, and conflict on the ground increased. The number of suicide bombings 
against Israeli civilians escalated, and included an attack upon a religious service that 
resulted in the highest death toll of Israelis during the conflict.
86
 Israel’s response to 
the increased violence was the construction of a temporary solution in the form of a 
security structure separating the territories of Israel from both the Gaza Strip and the 
West Bank. In December 2003 Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, declared Israel’s 
physical withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.
87
 The disengagement of Israel within the 
Gaza Strip witnessed the expulsion of approximately 9000 Israeli settlers. By 15 
August 2005, with the exception of armed forces, no Israeli could enter the Gaza 
Strip.
88
 
 
Following tense negotiation in light of Israel’s withdrawal from the West Bank , the 
new plan for Palestinian territory partitioning had taken place at the second round of 
the Oslo Peace Process. The new plan, known as the ‘Swiss Cheese’ map, reflected a 
geographically divided Palestinian community within the West Bank. The Oslo Peace 
Process, based on Security Council Resolution s 242 and 338 and its demand for 
Israel’s withdrawal from the West Bank, divided the territory into three areas: A, B, 
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and C. Area A, which housed the larger population, was only allocated 3per cent of 
the territory, which came under full Palestinian control. Area B, an area that included 
more sparsely populated Palestinian communities, was granted 29 per cent of the 
territory and came under joint Palestinian and Israeli control. The rest of the West 
Bank , Area C, remained under Israeli control, and would be gradually transferred 
back to the Palestinian authorities.   
 
2.3.3 The legal status of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank  
 
The question relating to the status of the Gaza Strip as either part of sovereign 
Palestine or part of the Occupied Palestinian Territories has long been ignored by 
Israel. The official position of Israel is that the Gaza Strip belongs to neither of the 
categories. Israel’s status of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank as ‘disputed territories’ 
rather than ‘occupied’ denies Palestinians the protection of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention. The denial of Palestinian sovereignty provides Israel with the right to 
ignore the rules that govern international relations between two sovereign states. 
Furthermore, Israel’s unwillingness to sign the 1977 Additional Protocol to the 
Geneva Conventions defining military and civilian targets provides Israel with the 
claim that it is not bound by the said provisions.
89
 In 1967, during the Six Day War, 
Israeli Defence forces (IDF) entered the Gaza Strip. Israeli forces established a 
military administration with the purpose of governing the territory. This system came 
to a close in 2005. Israel withdrew both its armed forces, as well as Israeli civilians 
residing within the area. Today the Gaza Strip is under the control of Hamas, an 
Islamic Resistance Movement. 
90
 
 
The withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip, as had been noted within the 
Disengagement Plan, reflected the Israeli opinion that withdrawal meant the end to 
the claim that the Gaza Strip is occupied. This sentiment of the Israeli government 
suggested its unwillingness to respect its obligations as an occupying power towards 
the population within the occupied territory. The actions of the Israeli government and 
its forces, not having completely separated itself form the governance of the area, 
suggests otherwise. Israel, through its control of the Gaza Strip’s air space, coastline, 
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electricity, population registry, phone networks, and water sewage, and its continued 
control of most export crossings, suggests the hidden system with which Israel 
controls the territory of the Gaza Strip. Furthermore, included within the revised 
Disengagement Plan, is the secured right of Israel to use force in “self-defence” 
within the Gaza Strip. 
91
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
In consideration of the biblical and historical account of the events that are presently 
unfolding in the Occupied Palestinian Territories one is able to understand the 
complexity of the situation. Furthermore, the analysis of the 1967 borders provides a 
platform to adequately understand the implementation of IHL in a conflict that after 
complete study reveals itself as an international armed conflict.  
 
Chapter 3 will discuss the duties of the United Nations and the International 
Committee of the Red Cross.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                
91
 James C ‘Mere Words: The 'Enemy Entity' Designation of the Gaza Strip’ (2009) 32 Hastings 
International and Comparative Law 643-646. 
 
 
 
 
 33 
CHAPTER 3 
THE DUTIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will address the duty of the UN in the protection of civilians caught 
within an international armed conflict. It will seek to articulate the duties of the UN 
specific to civilians residing within the Green Line. Consequently, unwrapping UN 
Resolution s 181 (II) and 242, as well as the Oslo Accords, Chapter 3 will conclude 
by addressing the responsibility of the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC). Importantly, Chapter 3 will address the ICRC's inaction in bringing to the 
attention of the international community the ongoing IHL violations within the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories.  
 
Intervention is a term used to indicate a form of interference in the internal affairs of 
another state or states in conflict. Intervention may come in the form of economic or 
political exertion made by states or international bodies external to the conflict.
92
  
 
3.2 What is the duty of the UN Relative to the protection of Civilians in an 
International Armed Conflict? 
 
A highly sought after method of intervention is the call for discussion of intervention 
within the UN.
93
 The right of intervention of the UN is however restricted under Art 
2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations. Art 2(7) addresses the prohibition of the 
UN intervening in matters that ‘are essentially within the jurisdiction of any state’.94 
States that are bound by the Charter would, however, in some sense have renounced 
their right to exclusive domestic jurisdiction. These states are therefore expected to 
abide by certain enforcement action in the event that world peace is threatened.
95
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Drawing on the above description of Member States of the UN, it could be concluded 
that states that have not joined the membership of the UN would be exempt from any 
UN action. The laws of peremptory jus cogens norms would however remain in 
effect.
96
 These laws in their prohibition of gross violations of human rights allow for 
intervention in any state (A member or non-member of the UN) if the rights enshrined 
within the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the like are violated.  An 
exemplary example is the intervention of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) in Kosovo in light of various human rights abuses that had occurred.
97
 
 
An important aspect of intervention is the duality of its nature, taking both the form of 
cohesion and involvement in the domestic affairs of a state.
98
 An all-important means 
by which war is prevented begins with condemnation by the international community 
and by declarations of the UN. The lack of condemnation was witnessed in 1980 with 
the invasion of Iran by Iraq. Both France and the United Kingdom remained silent as 
the conflict escalated. The reason for the silence was a direct result of the large-scale 
investments made by France and the United Kingdom in Iraq. The Security Council 
of the UN did not propose any considerable steps in ending the conflict.
99
 Equally 
tragic is the conflict that plagued the population of East Timor for 25 years. The 
ultimate genocide of the people at the hands of Indonesia finally gained the attention 
of the international community in 1999.
100
 These conflicts are indicative of the 
character of many other conflicts emphasizing the need for early stage condemnation 
in an attempt to prevent prolonged fighting.  
 
In relation to the severity of conflict the need for negotiation at an international level 
should be emphasized. The UN being the forum through which negotiation takes 
place houses the means by which a settlement may be reached. The ‘Hot Line’ 
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Agreement
101
 may therefore eliminate an unplanned eruption of conflict.  A specific 
body within the UN with the sole responsibility of mediating within a specific conflict 
situation may also reduce tension between the parties involved. Subsequently, the UN 
may make use of institutional mechanisms in order to eliminate the effects of armed 
conflict. This may be reached through ‘quiet diplomacy’, on the spot observation, and 
surveillance.
102
 
 
Furthermore, The failure of the international judicial system has in many cases 
prolonged the state of war. The United States in Nicaragua v. United States of 
America argued that the ICJ did not have jurisdiction over the matter, finding that the 
case fell within the scope of the Security Council.
103
 The United States, however, 
changed its view in United States v Iran too. Within the proceedings of the Iranian 
hostage case the lack of acknowledgement of the international judicial system was 
emphasized when Iran neither presented itself before the court nor adhered to the 
interim order.
104
 This was also witnessed in Nicaragua v. United States of America 
when the United States abandoned the proceedings halfway.
105
 A forceful intervention 
in matters by the ICJ may therefore reinforce respect for the international judicial 
system, with no leeway for the undermining of international law.  
3.2.1 The Role of Disarmament and Arms Trade  
 
An important aspect that affects the stability of relations between nations is the role of 
disarmament. A distinction is generally made between arms control, arms limitation 
and disarmament. Arms control refers to restraint in the use, manufacturing, testing, 
or deploying of a specific type of weapon. Disarmament, however, refers to the 
reduction in or the complete disallowance of a type of weapon.
106
 Arms limitation, 
along with its accompanying laws, entails the inevitable ‘reduction’ or ‘renunciation’ 
of certain kinds of weapons, or weapon usage. The rules related to both arms control 
and disarmament enshrined within various Conventions, such as the En-Mod 
convention, has however not been granted its due place within the law of war. 
107
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Early attempts at disarmament can be traced back to 1902 in the Treaty between Chile 
and Argentina.  Both parties involved cancelled all orders for warships and were to 
notify each other in the event of any new construction. The contemporary scene of 
disarmament radically changed with the fall of communism as it reduced the notion of 
disarmament to a secondary issue in conflict.
108
 This is evident in the proceedings of 
the Geneva disarmament conference. Previously housing special full-time 
ambassadors with substantial staff, the conference was reduced to States’ 
Ambassadors to the UN acting as delegates to the conference. The absence of 
substantial analytical studies in recent years by the conference is a further indication 
of a lack of efficiency by the international community in addressing the fundamental 
issue of the use of weaponry within armed conflict.
109
  
 
Complementary to the issue of disarmament is the issue of arms trade.  The restriction 
of arms trade has a direct effect on the number of parties that have conflict waging 
capabilities. This sentiment was dually noted by the US in 1939 with its 
condemnation of air raids on civilians.
110
 The sentiment held that the manufacturers 
and exporters of aeroplanes should not underestimate the effect of air raids on 
civilians when negotiating sales with nations who were synonymous with leading 
unprovoked bombings.
111
  
 
3.3 Has the UN Fulfilled its obligations as enshrined within:  
3.3.1 Resolution 181 (II)  
 
Art 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations States: 
 
‘Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish empire have reached a stage 
of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally 
recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a 
Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these 
communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.’112  
 
                                                                
108
 Detter I The Law of War 2 ed (2000) 109-112.  
109
 Detter I The Law of War 2 ed (2000) 109-112.  
110
 Tanaka Y, Young MB Bombing Civilians: A Twentieth Century History  (2009) np. 
111
 Detter I The Law of War 2 ed (2000) 109-112. 
112
 Covenant of the League of Nations, 1919, Art 22 (1919).  
 
 
 
 
 37 
The League of Nations in its affirmation of the applicability of the right to self-
determination to the people of Palestine established a temporary mandatory system in 
order to facilitate the independence of Palestine. This was reaffirmed by the UN in the 
adoption of General Assembly Resolution 181, the partition plan of Palestine. The 
implementation of the Resolution acts as recognition of the national heterogeneity of 
both the ‘Arab’ and ‘Jewish’ states.113  
 
Resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947 outlines the renewed government of 
Palestine. It begins by emphasizing the requirement for the establishment of 
independent Arab and Jewish States. This is extended to the establishment of a 
Special International Regime for the City of Jerusalem. The boundaries of the 
territories (as described in part II of this plan) are to be modified in such a way that 
village areas are not separated by state boundaries, unless no other alternative exists. 
The Resolution extends the obligations of the two parties to the settlement of its 
duties in a manner that does not infringe on international peace and security. This 
therefore guarantees each citizen residing within both territories their equal civil, 
political, economic, and religious rights.
114
 Importantly, the Resolution emphasizes 
the freedoms of ‘transit’ and ‘visit’ for all residents and citizens of the other state in 
Palestine and the City of Jerusalem.
115
  Furthermore, it emphasizes that respect that is 
to be observed when engaging in areas that house religious structures. The Resolution 
also calls for the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of ‘race, religion, 
language, or sex’, and extends this prohibition to discrimination, interference, or 
obstruction against ‘charitable bodies’.116  
 
Policies established by the State of Israel are, however, in contradiction to Resolution 
181. Antonio Cassesse renders the right to self-determination as an anti-racist claim in 
his statement: ‘Internal' self-determination amounts to the right of an ethnic, racial, or 
religious segment of the population in a sovereign country not to be oppressed by a 
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discriminatory government.’ 117  This statement therefore addresses the lack of 
recognition of Palestinian citizens residing within the territory of Israel. This 
unpronounced second-class status granted to the Palestinian citizens therefore denies 
them access to the right of self-determination. This is emphasized by the inability of 
the UN to deter the transfer of populations in the establishment of settlements within 
the territory of Palestine. The UN in its admission of the state of Israel as a Member 
State on 11 May 1949 declared Israel a ‘peace-loving state that accepts the obligations 
contained in the Charter’. The UN made this declaration in light of both violations 
against Palestinian citizens, as well as Resolution 181 (1947).
118
 
 
3.3.2 Resolution 242 
 
In a second instance the UN has failed to safeguard the absolute rights defined by 
Resolution 242. Adopted on 22 November 1967 Resolution 242 endeavours to 
address the continued concern for the situation in Palestine following the Six Day 
War.
119
 In reference to Art VI of the UN Charter, the Resolution was one of five 
drafts under consideration. In consultation with the UN Special Representative, 
Egypt, Jordan, Israel, and Lebanon embarked on a peace settlement. Resolution 242 
begins by stipulating the complete inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory 
through war, and therefore requires the withdrawal of armed forces from territories 
occupied during the Six Day War.
120
 Art 2 of the UN Charter requires that members 
abstain from territorial acquisition and threatening the political independence of any 
state through the use of force.
121
 It is apparent that ‘no title by conquest’ may occur. It 
is therefore important to note the limits of warfare. A war originating within the 
confines of self-defence would, as the Israeli/Palestinian conflict has been defined, 
not legitimize the usurpation of territory. 
 
Furthermore, the duty of the Israeli Government is extended to ending the state of 
‘belligerency’ by the acknowledgement of the sovereignty and political independence 
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of states. The Resolution specifically makes mention of the ‘right to live in peace 
within secure boundaries free from threats or acts of force’.122 This therefore indicates 
that defined boundaries have been stipulated. Furthermore, the scope of the issue is 
extended to the refugee problem and it should acknowledge it as an undeniable 
problem resulting from the ongoing usurpation of land through conflict.
123
 The Israeli 
Ambassador to the UN Security Council conveyed on 1 May 1968 the official 
position of Israel as the:  
 
‘Acceptance of the Security Council Resolution for the promotion of agreement on the 
establishment of a just and lasting peace. I am also authorized to reaffirm that we are 
willing to seek agreement with each Arab State on all matters included in that 
Resolution’  
 
After much debate, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in September 1993 
signed the Declaration Principles, agreeing that Resolution 242 and Resolution 338 
would be the foundation for negotiations with Israel.
124
 The vague language used in 
reference to the withdrawal of troops from the territories by Israel, suggests that the 
concealed loophole benefits a lengthy withdrawal.
125
 The UN through its revision of 
the document undertook to improve the standards by which to achieve a peace 
settlement. It is therefore unacceptable that the absence of certainty within the 
language be accepted by those involved.  
 
3.3.3 The Oslo Accords 
 
Known as the Declaration of Principles on the Interim Self-Government 
Arrangements, the negotiations were constructed in what became known as Oslo I, II 
and III. The framework of Oslo I, completed in 1993, was an attempt to establish a 
state of peace within Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories.
126
 The discourse 
addressed major outstanding issues after an interim period during which the PLO 
would govern parts of the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The Declaration begins 
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with the recognition by both the state of Israel and the PLO of the mutual legitimacy 
and political rights of their respective citizens, promising a future free of threat to the 
dignity and security of its peoples as a result of the ongoing conflict. The parties both 
agree to the following principles as enshrined within the Oslo Accords.
127
 Art 1 
emphasizes the purposes of the negotiations as being in part to institute a Palestinian 
Interim Self-Government Authority. This Authority is to administer the territory of 
the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, for a period not exceeding five years,
128
 thereafter 
leading to the implementation of Resolution s 242 and 338. Annex III to the 
Declaration establishes an all-important protocol which emphasizes the expected 
cooperation of the state of Israel, as well as the PLO in the development of water, 
electricity, energy, finance, transport, trade promotion, industrial development, and 
environmental and media programmes.
129
 Annex IV provides for a protocol focussing 
on the regional and developmental programs, further ensuring that the program 
initiated for the Gaza Strip and the West Bank will include social rehabilitation, 
housing, and construction.
130
  
 
Oslo II outlines the conditions under which the PLO will conduct partial 
administration.
131
 Art XVI and VII of the Oslo II agreements discuss the terms under 
which administrative detainees and sentenced prisoners are to be released.
132
 This 
negotiation, in contrast to the Gaza-Jericho Agreement
133
 that was signed a year 
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before the Oslo II negotiations, called for the release of prisoners based on criteria 
rather than quantity. Furthermore, Oslo II asserted respect for the rights of released 
prisoners to return to their homes in the Gaza Strip and The West Bank , rather than 
have the prisoners remain within Jericho as stipulated by the Gaza-Jericho 
Agreement. Art XIX of Oslo II stipulates that Israel and the PLO act with due respect 
for the principles of human rights and the rule of law.
134
 Oslo III, addresses the terms 
under which Israel’s partial withdrawal from Hebron will take place. Oslo III further 
demarcates areas of withdrawal described under Oslo II. 
135
 With the establishment of 
the Madrid-Oslo Accords the assumption was made that the Palestinian citizens 
would be granted the freedom to access their rights by means of statehood within 
Occupied Palestinian Territories.
136
 
 
Despite the agreed upon terms, continued construction of settlements within the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories has taken place. With the curtain drawn on the 
accords, Israeli settlements grew by 3 850 units between 1994-1995 and 3 570 units in 
1996-1997,
137
 whilst Palestinians built throughout area C of the West Bank that today 
are known as Palestinian outposts/settlements within Israel. The situation following 
the signing of the Accords intensified with continued attacks on both sides. The 
fighting by Palestinians erupted as a result of mistrust of Israel’s intention to evacuate 
the said area,
138
 whilst Israelis feared that the process may result in the loss of their 
homes. Furthermore, an important aspect relating to the interpretation of the 
document was neglected. In a video recorded in 2001, Israeli Prime Minister, 
Benjamin Netanyahu, unaware that he was being recorded, stated the following:  
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‘They asked me before the election if I'd honour [the Oslo Accords]... I said I would, 
but [that] I'm going to interpret the Accords in such a way that would allow me to put 
an end to this galloping forward to the '67 borders. How did we do it? Nobody said 
what defined military zones were. Defined military zones are security zones; as far as 
I'm concerned, the entire Jordan Valley is a defined military zone. 
139
  
 
This statement is an indication of the important nature of the terminology used, as 
well as the lack of an official interpretation of the Accords. The PLO in accepting a 
territorial compromise in the interests of national independence and sovereignty had 
made the assumption that the UN would assist in assuring the freedom of access to 
rights by the Palestinian citizens and refugees.
140
 This has however not materialized in 
the self-determination of Palestinians both within the Occupied Palestinian Territories 
as well as within Israel. 
 
3.4 What is the duty of the ICRC relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons caught within an International Armed Conflict? 
 
The mission of the ICRC is of a purely humanitarian nature. Considering itself as 
being ‘impartial, neutral, and independent’ the organization endeavours to protect the 
lives of victims caught within an armed conflict situation. Furthermore, the scope of 
the ICRC duties is extended to the prevention and alleviation of the effect of warfare 
on the quality of life of victims by improving the standards of humanitarian law. After 
writing on his experience in the conflict in his book, ‘A Memory of Solferino’, 
Dunant subsequently provided two proposals that gained considerable attention.
141
  
 
The first proposal called for the neutrality of army medical vehicles in order that they 
may be able to function on the battlefield. Furthermore, that the army medical 
services be provided with a distinctive emblem. The second proposal called for the 
formation, in peacetime, of ‘voluntary relief societies’ that could act as support in 
wartime in assisting the army medical services. As a result of the proposal made by 
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Dunant, the ICRC was established in 1963. Subsequently on 22 August of the 
following year the Convention for the Amelioration of the Wounded in Armies was 
adopted, acting as the source of IHL. With its constant reporting on armed conflict 
situations the ICRC has made useful proposals for the improvement of IHL. This has 
resulted in the revision and extension of the discipline, notably in 1901, 1929, 1949, 
and 1977. 
142
 
 
As the ‘guardian’ of IHL, the ICRC’s role provides the organization with numerous 
functions within armed conflict situations. The first function to be discussed is the 
‘monitoring function’, described as being the ‘constant reappraisal of humanitarian 
rules’ in order to an understand the means available for the enforcement of the law 
within armed conflict situations. This will consequently lead to the understanding of 
the sociological aspect of conflict, providing possible preventative measures. It is 
therefore apparent that even though much has been done to improve the discipline 
there is a continued need to improve and understand IHL. The second function, the 
‘catalyst function’, encourages discussions within governmental groups and experts 
regarding the problems encountered during warfare in an attempt to attain possible 
solutions.   The third function is the ‘promotion function’. This allows the ICRC to 
advocate in favour of the law by propagating its teachings in order to encourage the 
adoption of the laws by states on a national level.
143
  
 
States would therefore be encouraged to agree to the ratification of instruments at 
diplomatic conferences, implement IHL at a national level by means of legislations, 
and apply IHL to all. The ‘guardian angel’ function encourages the defence of IHL in 
light of those who disregard the law, or in instances in which the law is weakened by 
the exclusion of important issues in ratified documents. The ‘direct action’ function 
encourages the direct contribution of the ICRC in the application of the law. This can 
be done through direct communication with parties to the conflict, and assistance to 
victims. The final function is the ‘watchdog’ function that promotes the dissemination 
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of awareness of violations amongst states, the parties to the conflict, and finally the 
international community.
144
 
 
The ICRC, following its initiative to adopt the original Geneva Convention of 1864, 
encouraged governments to adapt to the changing nature of warfare.  With close 
consideration of the means and methods of warfare that have increased the death toll, 
as well as the level of destruction to territories exposed to conflict, the Geneva 
Convention of 1949 is today ratified by all states.  
3.4.1 The legal Basis for ICRC Intervention  
 
The four Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I provide the ICRC with a 
specific mandate under which it is to act in the event of an international armed 
conflict. The ICRC is therefore mandated to visit prisoners of war and civilian 
detainees, taking the initiative in the maintenance of IHL. The ICRC shares in the 
right to humanitarian intervention in non-international armed conflicts. This has been 
stipulated within Common Art 3 to the Geneva Conventions.
145
 The ICRC may also 
provide humanitarian services in areas in which IHL does not apply without their 
assistance being constituted as interference in the internal affairs of the state 
concerned.
146
  
3.4.2 Has the ICRC upheld its duties in the protection of civilians in the 
Israeli/Palestinian conflict?  
 
The 2007 International Conference requested that all concerned parties support the 
implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). In conjunction with 
the Council of Delegates Resolution of 2009 that ‘requests National Societies to 
favourably respond to any request for Help and support that the Monitor may ask of 
them in the fulfilment of his task up to the next Council of Delegates’, the MoU is 
required to inform national societies and the governments concerned about the 
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outcome of the implementation and monitoring process.
147
 With respect to the 
Israeli/Palestinian conflict decision made in 2007, and again at the international 
conference in 2009 at the Council of Delegates (CoD), Minister (Hon) Par Stenback 
has continued to function as the Independent Monitor for the implementation of the 
(MoU). Minister Stenback also functions as the Independent Monitor for the 
Agreement on the Operational Arrangements (AOA) between the Palestinian Red 
Crescent Society (PRCS) and Magen David Adom in Israel (MDA).
148
   
 
The CoD in 2009 in reference to the MoU stated that admirable results had been 
achieved between the PRCS and MDA, The only setback was the presence of MDA 
marked ambulances in the Occupied Palestinian Territories as has been required by 
the MoU. The 2009 CoD, which took place in Nairobi, noted that five PRCS 
ambulances were operational by June 2009. This process is confirmed with the 
MDA’s installation of GPS systems in the ambulances, granting them access to 
hospitals in West Jerusalem.  The report also notes that the same five ambulances 
continue to attend to the needs of the residents of East Jerusalem and also respond to 
the residents who reside on the opposite end of the West Bank. They therefore have 
access to all hospitals within the area. The operation of the five ambulances requires 
the service of both West Bank and East Jerusalem staff. The West Bank staff requires 
permits to enter East Jerusalem. These permits are granted by the Israeli government 
authorities, and have a three-month validated period. However, between October and 
September of 2010 the organization was unable to acquire permit renewals for 32 of 
its West Bank employees. As a result the service remained defective for 19 days. The 
process was however accelerated with the intervention of the MDA at the request of 
the ICRC. The consequences of the necessity for the renewal of permits for the 
service delivery of the PRCS emphasizes the need for the improvement of the system. 
This had subsequently highlighted the inconsistent nature of administrative 
bureaucracy. The intervention of the MDA however showcased the willingness of the 
two societies to work together. As a result of the interruption of the PRCS’s service to 
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East Jerusalem both the MDA and PRCS have agreed that permits with an access 
period of six months would be requested.
149
  
 
The 2009 report of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) also describes the access of the 
PRCS through checkpoints. The main area noted as being problematic to enter is 
Nablus. Other areas include Ramallah, as the PRSC experiences difficulties in 
accessing the area through the Beit El checkpoint.  Accessing the enclave of 
Barta’aresh Shamiya in the northwestern area of the West Bank also remains 
problematic. The enclave is home to a village of 5 000, with a neighbouring 
population of 15 000.
150
 The PRSC not being able to access the area via the Reikhan 
Barta checkpoint creates a situation in which community members requiring medical 
care rely on private transport to the checkpoint. Once at the checkpoint they may then 
be collected on the other side of the checkpoint by the PRSC’s emergency medical 
services (EMS) from Jenin. A third area that is problematic to enter is the old city of 
the H2
151
 area of the southern West Bank city of Hebron. This restriction is extended 
to both the EMS of the PRSC, as well as to vehicles of Palestinian registration. 
Despite the entry of ambulances into the H2 areas without requiring Israeli authority, 
extensive detours need to be travelled from H1 to parts of H2, as well as within the 
area of H2. This is due to the restriction in certain areas that hinder the movement of 
certain vehicles and of the population. The PRCS in response to these restrictions is 
attempting to station a temporary ambulance within the area of H2. 
152
 
 
The MoD further acknowledges the difficulties faced by EMS vehicles carrying 
patients holding West Bank IDs into the area of East Jerusalem. This issue is a result 
of complex and time-consuming protocols made by the Israeli Government for the 
transfer of trauma patients. The situation has improved with the transfer of patients 
being made the responsibility of Jerusalem registered ambulances. The MDA and 
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PRSC have in 2010 agreed upon the definition of emergency cases, as well as the 
manner in which emergency cases will be treated. The MDA with the support of the 
MoD has in reaction to the difficulties encountered by the PRSC appealed to the 
Israeli authorities to promote respect for the protocol concerning the treatment of 
emergency cases agreed upon with the PRCS. This plea has however not been granted 
the required attention. The Israeli Government has continued to insist on the strict 
control of all patients not holding Jerusalem IDs whilst granting no special status on 
the basis of the severity of the situation.
153
  
 
With regards to the transportation of patients from the Gaza Strip to east Jerusalem 
the PRSC has not had an active role outside the realm of using their five ambulances 
for the transportation of patients. The MDA has therefore called for the increased role 
of the PRSC’s EMS staff when transporting patients. 154 The Monitor in numerous 
reports notably commends the co-operation between the two societies. The nature of 
the relations is however not without fault, and much is needed to be done in the full 
implementation of the MoU. An important cause of the problematic implementation 
of the MoU is the lack of influence of the MDA in the improvement of the working 
conditions of the PRCS. Secondly, the effect of the restrictions enforced by the Israeli 
government on the PRCS’s ability to perform its duties hinders the process. This 
problem is further exacerbated by the misuse of the emblems. This problem finds its 
roots in both the Israeli administration, as well as Palestinian legislation. Since the 
Israeli Government has not amended the MDA law, the revisions of 2006 of the 
statute that allows for improved protection of the emblem have not been instituted. 
The Palestinian Legislative Council has not sat since 2007 and this has resulted in the 
‘law’ (decree) being left unsigned. The protection of the emblem has therefore no 
legal basis. The responsibility to propagate the doctrine of protection of the emblems 
has therefore fallen on the MDA and PRCS.
155
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3.5 Conclusion 
 
The analysis of the duties of the UN and the ICRC provides a compelling indication 
that more needs to be done in order to establish respect for IHL within the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories. The various methods of intervention mentioned have not been 
sufficiently implemented as a means of deterrence. Furthermore, obligations set forth 
within Resolution 181 (II), Resolution 242, and the Oslo Accords have not 
materialized. Importantly, no real engagement on the lack of implementation of the 
various peace agreements has taken place. This lack of repercussion emphasizes the 
UN’s lack of control and ability to implement agreements. The insufficient 
availability of medical supplies, vehicles, and personal within the Occupied Palestine 
Territories establishes a need for improved healthcare structures. With the increase in 
casualties, injuries, and illnesses within an existing crippled healthcare system the 
failure on the part of the ICRC and the lack of communication by the Israeli and 
Palestinian authorities are unacceptable.  
 
Chapter 4 will discuss the duties of the occupying power.  
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CHAPTER 4 
THE DUTIES OF THE OCCUPYING POWER 
4.1 Introduction  
 
The Enlightenment period witnessed the engagement of numerous scholars with 
understanding the laws of war.
156
 Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s argument encouraged the 
notion that warfare existed between states. This idea excluded the ‘private’ person as 
having to be subjected to the onslaught of warfare.
157
 George F. Von Martens 
advocated for the protection of women, children, and the aged, against the atrocities 
that are caused by warfare.
158
 An important aspect of the views of these scholars is, 
therefore, the distinction between combatants and non-combatants, with the aspiration 
of providing a means by which the property and person of non-combatants are to be 
protected. The discourse of laws of war, therefore, shifted the narrative from a state-
centric one to a discourse that promoted the rights of the individual.  
 
Laws pertaining to occupation were established as an extension of the law of war. The 
Lieber Code, often regarded as the genesis of the laws of belligerent occupation, 
prioritized military considerations over humanitarian interests.
159
 The first 
codification of the laws of belligerent occupation occurred in Brussels in1874 with 
the drafting of comprehensive regulations on war.
160
 The more powerful nations 
perceived the draft as humanitarian in nature, whilst less powerful nations considered 
the regulations to leave them militarily vulnerable. The nations that participated 
agreed on the definition of occupation; a territory placed under the occupation of a 
hostile army bounded by the territories around which it could establish and exercise 
authority. The Brussels Declaration did, however, assert that occupation is of a 
temporary nature, and that the laws of the occupied population are not terminated. 
The Declaration, furthermore, established that the laws of occupation confers upon 
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the occupying power the duty to manage the occupied territory for the duration of 
occupation, but does not grant the occupier sovereignty. Laws of belligerent 
occupation, therefore, codify the interest of the state, and are often asserted at the 
expense of the individual.
161
 
 
In this chapter it will be argued that Israel as an occupying state has not fulfilled its duty 
to protect the structures, as well as the quality of life of civilians residing within both 
Israeli and Palestinian territory. Subsequently, this chapter will address the rights of the 
Palestinian citizens as protected persons residing within an occupied territory. In 
conclusion, Chapter 4 will address the failure of the occupying power, as well as possible 
solutions to the conflict.   
 
4.2 What is the duty of the occupying power as stated in the Fourth Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War? 
 
Relative to Art 43 of The Hague Regulations, Art 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention 
law states:  
‘The penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force, with the exception that 
they may be repealed or suspended by the occupying power in cases where they 
constitute threat to its security or an obstacle to the application of the present 
convention. Subject to the latter consideration and to the necessity for ensuring the 
effective administration of justice, the tribunals of the occupied territory shall 
continue to function in respect of all offences covered by the said law. The occupying 
power may, however, subject the population of the occupying territory to the 
provisions which are essential to enable the occupying power to fulfil its obligations 
under the present convention, to maintain the orderly government of the territory, and 
to ensure the security of the occupying power, of the members and the property of the 
occupying forces or administration, and likewise of the establishments and lines of 
communication used by them.’162 
Though restricting the full capacity of the right to administer a territory, Art 64 makes 
provision for full administration by the occupying power under special circumstances. Art 
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64 is applied if the occupying power fulfils its positive duties relative to the protection of 
the occupied population. It is complemented by the provisions that give primacy to the 
rights of the population under occupation by the Fourth Geneva Convention.
163
 It is 
therefore imperative that the occupying power acknowledges the sovereign rights of the 
occupied population set out in the Fourth Geneva Convention.  
Section III of the Fourth Geneva Convention establishes the laws by which the occupying 
power is to abide. The foremost law established under Art 47 speaks to the rights of the 
‘protected persons’ who find themselves in the Occupied Territories. These persons are to 
enjoy their rights set out in the Fourth Geneva Convention irrespective of changes 
introduced by the existence of an occupation.
164
 Protected persons who are not nationals 
of the territory occupied may reserve the right to leave the territory as prescribed in Art 
48
165
 in respect to the provisions under Art 35.
166
 Mass deportations of protected persons 
are prohibited unless the security of the territory is challenged requiring the total or partial 
evacuation of the occupied territory. The standard of the housing of the protected persons 
is to consider hygiene, safety, health and nutrition.
167
 Furthermore, family members may 
not be separated.
168
  
Art 49 extends the duty of the occupying power to the protection of the territory occupied 
against the deportation or transfer of the population of the occupying power into the 
occupied lands.
169
 Furthermore, Art 50 makes provision that the occupying powers aid the 
national and local administrations of the territory in improving the education and medical 
systems, taking into account the state of hygiene and public health within the Occupied 
Territories. With the exemption of exceptional cases of military necessity, the destruction 
of ‘real or personal’ property belonging to the occupied population (individual or group) 
or state, is prohibited. The occupying power also has the duty of ‘ensuring the food and 
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medical supplies of the population’ are provided.170  
Art 55 makes further provision detailing the right to medical and food supplies of both the 
occupation forces and the administration personal, with due payment. This is only to be 
provided with the certainty that the occupied population has been granted adequate 
supplies.
171
 The occupying power may make use of the hospitals of the Occupied 
Territories in order to facilitate the care of wounded or sick military personal. The 
temporary appropriation of the hospitals can only take place once due consideration has 
been given to the patients of the occupied population.
172
 Art 59 obliges the occupying 
power to allow aid to the occupied population from relief schemes, and furthermore 
emphasizes the duty of the occupying power to assist in the distribution of the goods to 
the population within the occupied territory. These goods may consist, in part, of clothing, 
medical supplies, and food supplies.  
The use of the phrase ‘all contracting parties…shall guarantee their protection’ asserts the 
right of the occupied population to their human rights in accessing their basic needs. ‘A 
power granting free passage’ of the goods does however retain the right to search the 
supplies whilst also monitoring their passage into the territory.
173
 Any diversion of the 
supplies from the occupied territory, including cases of necessity, requires the consent of 
the protecting power.
174
 The distribution of the supplies is therefore to be done under the 
supervision of the protecting power, and may with due consent by both the occupying 
power and the protecting power be delegated to a neutral power.
175
  
Art 63 emphasizes the duty of the occupying power to safeguard the work of the ICRC, as 
well as other relief agencies working to improve the humanitarian standards within the 
occupied territory. Except when deemed necessary, the occupying power may not request 
a change of personnel or in the structure of the society that may affect the activities of the 
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society.
176
 With regard to the penal laws of the occupied territory, the occupying power 
may not make alterations except in cases in which the security of the occupied territory is 
placed at risk or if the laws are ‘contradictory’ to the four Geneva Conventions creating 
difficulty in the enforcement of the standards of IHL. The courts of the Occupied 
Territories may therefore be deemed functional. Penal provisions made by the occupied 
power may not come into force without the knowledge of the occupied population of the 
law to be disseminated to them in their own language. These laws are not be 
retroactive.
177
 For any breach of the law as stipulated by Art 64 of the Convention 
provides that the occupying power may hand over the accused to its ‘properly constituted, 
non-military courts’ in the occupied territory. 178  Furthermore, the Fourth Geneva 
Convention extends the duty of the courts to look to the fact that the accused is not a 
national of the occupying power. The penalty imposed is to be proportionate to the 
crime.
179
 Art 71 asserts the duty of the occupying power to establish regular trials before 
the sentencing of an accused. The accused is to be notified in writing, in a language that 
they understand, of the charge against them.
180
 This provision under Art 71 draws 
attention to Art 9 and Art 14 of the ICCPR
181
 and Art 9 and Art 10 of the UDHR.
182
   
4.2.1 Israel’s position with regards to its duty as occupying power 
 
With the acquisition of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967 by Israel, the status of 
the territories came into question. Acting as the High Court of Justice (HCJ) reviewing the 
administrative action of the military within the two territories, the Supreme Court of Israel 
was petitioned by Palestinian citizens to review incidents involving the actions of the 
military against them. Meir Shamgar, in 1967 the Advocate General of the IDF, accepted 
the petition on the basis of agreement by the Government of Israel. However with the 
increase of cases brought before the Court, the HCJ’s legal power to issue orders against  
‘all bodies that perform public functions under law’ became the basis of jurisdiction. With 
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courts handing down judgments in hundreds of cases following the Six Day War a large 
body of law relating to the Occupied Territories has been established.
183
   
With the entry of the military into the Occupied Territories in the Six Day War numerous 
military tribunals were established with the objective of trying local residents who were 
accused of security offences. The military order indicated that the provisions of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention should be applied. The inclusion of these provisions thus created an 
understanding that the territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were to be treated 
as being under ‘belligerent occupation’. However, with the end of the Six Day War, the 
status of the territories came under scrutiny. Under the influence of both political and 
legal factions the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention were deleted from the 
military order, even though it was declared that the IDF respects the ‘humanitarian 
provisions of the convention’. The Government based this decision on the uncertainty of 
the nature of the status of the territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
184
 
Following the change in the military order, petitions challenging the exclusion of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention and, by extension, the ‘uncertain status’ of the territories, 
emerged. The petitioners argued that the norms of belligerent occupation stated in The 
Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention act as evidence that the two 
territories fall within the scope of these provisions. Though the Government argued for 
the status of the territories to be clarified, the military acted in terms of the provisions 
relating to belligerent occupation. After a period of time the provisions of the belligerent 
occupation became the standard by which authorities were evaluated within the Occupied 
Territories. Israel, in the absence of officially acknowledging the status of the territories, 
has referred to the territories as ‘administered territories’ rather than ‘Occupied 
Territories’.185  
Yoram Dinstein has stated the argument made by Israeli lawyers, in 1978, that 
‘belligerent occupation continues for as long as the occupant remains in the area and the 
war goes on.’186 A war is therefore said to terminate with the end of the conflict. This was 
noted on 15 March 1979, when the Supreme Court noted that a judgment was directly 
linked to the state of belligerency. However with the enforcement of the 1979 Peace 
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Treaty between Egypt and Israel the state of belligerency no longer existed. In the same 
manner that the Gaza Strip has not been part of the ‘territory of the hostile state’, Israel 
makes use of the provisions of ‘belligerent occupation’ when deems fit.187  
Drawing on the above it is imperative that the nature of the Israeli legal system be 
examined. The system, which is a dualist one, requires that domestic courts enforce norms 
of international law only if they are compatible with the primary legislation.
188
 The 
provisions’ of international conventions will only be imposed by the courts if they have 
been made part of customary international law or enacted as parliamentary legislation. In 
cases in which a clash exists between parliamentary legislation and customary 
international law, parliamentary legislation will take precedence.
189
 It is therefore 
important to note, that despite the ratification of the four Geneva Conventions by the 
Israeli government in 1951, their provisions have not formally been included into 
parliamentary legislation. Despite this discrepancy, the HCJ has continued to make use of 
the Fourth Geneva Convention in its proceedings. The basis for its actions in many cases 
is the encouragement of the Government of Israel toward respecting the humanitarian 
provisions of the Convention. Its it therefore evident that in spite of the fact that the 
Fourth Geneva Convention has never been included in customary international law, in 
cases relating to the Occupied Territories the standard practice of the HCJ has been to cite 
the provisions of the Convention. 
190
 
A further evaluation of the laws that bind the Israeli Government to the protection of 
international norms relates to international human rights law (IHRL). As evidence of the 
applicability of IHRL, the construction of the ‘separation barriers’ by Israel saw the ICJ 
include in its decision the jurisprudence of both the provisions relating to belligerent 
occupation, as well as IHRL. Though the government of Israel has formally rejected this 
argument, the HCJ has relied on the provisions of IHRL in cases relating to the Occupied 
Territories. The HCJ has justified this position by concluding that the norms of IHRL are 
within the framework of the law of belligerent occupation, and furthermore, by asserting 
the fact that as a party to the human rights treaties, Israel is bound by their provisions.
191
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4.3 What are the Rights of the Occupied Civilians as Stated by the Fourth 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War? 
 
Part II of the Fourth Geneva Convention relates to the protection of the whole of the 
populations of countries in conflict. These provisions apply without any distinction of 
race, nationality, religion or political opinion. Art 14 of the Convention speaks to the 
construction of hospitals and ‘safety zones’ during periods in which no outbreak of 
hostilities take place. These ‘safety zones’ are to be recognized by all high contracting 
parties to the conflict. Furthermore, Art 14 makes provision for the use of the ICRC in the 
establishment of these hospitals and safety zones.
192
 Art 15 of the Convention ascribes the 
right to any of the contracting parties to propose to an adverse party the intention to 
establish ‘neutralized zones’ with the intention of protecting the wounded and sick 
combatants and non-combatants, as well as civilians who have no part in the conflict. 
These ‘neutralized zones’ will be provided with a food supply.193  
Furthermore, Arts 16 and Art 17 of the Convention make imperative the respect for and 
the protection of the wounded and sick, the aged, children and expecting mothers.
194
 Arts 
17, 21, 22 and 23 make provision for the protection of religious leaders, medical personal 
and equipment, and essential foodstuff and clothing in hostile areas.
195
 Arts 18 to 22 refer 
to the protection of hospitals. Civilian hospitals are to be certified by both high 
contracting parties, and shall not be the object of attacks.
196
 These hospitals shall be 
marked by an emblem as indicted by Art 38 of the First Geneva Convention Relative to 
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field. 
These emblems are to be made distinctive to the ‘enemy land, air and naval forces’. All 
persons engaged with civilian hospitals are to be provided with certification indicating 
their status, their photograph, and a stamp of the responsible authority. These persons are 
also to be provided with a waterproof bracelet showcasing the emblem indicted in Art 38 
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of the First Geneva Convention, and are to be worn on the left arm while on duty.
197
  
Art 24 of the Fourth Geneva Convention makes reference to the protection of children 
under the age of 15 who as a result of conflict have been orphaned or separated from their 
families. These children are to be granted access to education and the practice of their 
respective religions. These children may be sent to a neutral country by the contracting 
parties with the consent of the protecting power with due regard to the previous 
provisions. Furthermore, the provision of identity discs to children under 12 should be 
made.
198
 Art 25 and 26 of the Convention make provision for the notification of family 
members. Individuals may send and receive information of a ‘strictly personal nature’. If 
for security reasons the parties to the conflict wish to limit contact, individuals may be 
allowed to communicate 25 freely chosen words per month. If the communication by 
ordinary post is not possible, then it is the duty of the parties to the conflict to ensure that 
the communication is transacted. Furthermore, Arts 25 and 26 makes provision for the 
unification of families as a result of the conflict by the high contracting parties to the 
conflict. These duties may be granted to organizations that are engaged with this task.
199
  
4.4 Appropriate Means that May Aid in Conflict Resolution  
4.4.1 Approaching the International Criminal Court 
 
As a test of the true judicial independence and legitimacy of the ICC, in the wake of 
escalating violence within the Occupied Territories there has been increased pressure by 
the international community. Though not formally recognizing Palestine as a state, the 
ICC, as well as its 133 members, is yet to act, and furthermore to address the situation in 
light of the fact that Israel is not a Member State of the ICC, having withdrawn its 
signature in 2002.
200
 The ICC could however act in accordance with formal requests by 
State Parties and the availability of the accused. The war crimes that have recently been 
brought to the attention of the ICC are the crimes committed by Israel and Hamas in 
‘Operation Cast Lead’ that began on 7 December 2008. The aim of the operation, as 
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stated by Israel, was to stop Hamas rocket launches into southern Israel, furthermore 
emphasizing the targeting of Hamas. International reaction called for an immediate 
ceasefire, resulting Resolution 1860 of the UN Security Council. The conflict has 
highlighted the indiscriminant use of force, as well as the general situation within the 
Gaza Strip. This has resulted in human rights groups and aid organizations calling for 
independent investigations into the conflict. Importantly, both Israel and Hamas found 
themselves accused of war crimes. The conflict ended on 18 January 2009, with the 
announcement of unilateral ceasefires.
201
 
As a means to a peaceful end of to the occupation the efficacy of the ICC should be 
challenged. In the period between 27 December 2008 and 13 February 2009, the ICC 
Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) received 326 communications from individuals, both 
independent and belonging to aid organizations that called for an investigation into the 
conflict. Though the ICC argued that it was unable to carry out such investigations, as 
Israel is not a Member State, the continued barrage by individuals changed the stance of 
the ICC. Art 12(3) of the Rome Statute asserts respect of the Court’s jurisdiction on an ad 
hoc basis by states that are not party to the Rome Statute, as has been the case with Cote 
d’Ivoire.202  
Following the outcry by the international community, Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-
Ocampo announced that the ICC would investigate methods by which to prosecute Israeli 
commanders for their alleged war crimes. This may possibly result in a solution to the 
ongoing attack on civilians within the Occupied Territories. However, a more fitting 
solution in the advocacy of the ICC’s relevance to the conflict could be the statehood of 
Palestine. In fulfilling the precondition for assessing jurisdiction the ICC may be required 
to advocate the statehood of the non-member party. Furthermore, the UN General 
Assembly may request an advisory opinion from the ICJ. This has been stipulated in Art 
65(2) of the Statute of the ICJ. An advisory opinion on the conflict, such as the one being 
discussed, has been provided concerning the construction of the ‘separation barrier’ in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories.
203
 Since the ICC’s jurisdiction is only relevant in 
instances where the national authorities are unable to or unwilling to hold genuine 
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proceedings, the situation in Palestine seems to fit the context of its jurisdiction.
204
  
4.4.2 Increased Economic Sanctions  
 
The concept of economic sanctions successfully used against the Apartheid regime of 
South Africa has yet to affect the Israel/Palestinian conflict. Since the onset of the 
occupation in 1948 and again in 1973 Israel has faced economic sanctions by 
neighbouring Arab states. Today, the concept of economic sanctions against Israel has 
evolved into an international trend known as BDS, ‘Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions’. 
This discourages any trade or business with Israel. The purpose of the sanction is to brand 
Israel as an Apartheid state. As a result Israel stands to lose 20 per cent of Israeli exports 
to the European Union and possibly a halt to any foreign direct trade.
205
 Israel’s trade with 
the European Union is not without restraint within the European Union since it has 
reinstated its decision to label products that are from the settlement areas. The overall 
amount of settlement products from the settlement areas to Europe is approximately 300 
million shekels ($90 million), most of the sales being generated by SodaStream.
206
 
According to the Maariv newspaper, the current boycott of Israel is affecting the economy 
of Israel with loses amounting to 100 million shekels ($30 million), most notably 
affecting the agricultural sector in the Jordan valley.
207
  
Though Israel enjoys a flourishing economy, the increased anti-Israel sentiment both in 
the USA and the European Union, and the opposition of Jews the world over, has created 
a sense of unease in the economic sector of Israel. Of the divestments, the notable BDS 
decisions include the divestment of the $200 billion Dutch pension fund PGGM.
208
 
Furthermore, the Israeli company SodaStream, which has a factory in the West Bank , has 
seen plummeting share prices. The company’s store in Brighton, England, has also closed 
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down.
209
 Sanctions as means to change the cause of the conflict from affecting civilians 
has proven to be effective to a degree. However, a much broader approach from the 
international community is required in order to exert maximum pressure on the parties 
involved.  
As a means to place pressure on Hamas, Israel too has enlisted the use of economic 
sanctions on Palestinians, more notably within the Gaza Strip. Israel, in control of the 
passage of goods in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, has blocked any passage of 
goods into the Gaza Strip via sea, air or the Rafah crossing separating the Gaza Strip and 
Egypt.
210
 Goods may be transported via the Karni crossing which separates Israel and the 
Gaza Strip. Israel has however instructed agents to deliver limited amounts of products 
into the Gaza Strip. These products include fuel, essential supplies and medicines.
211
  
 It is recorded that between 14 June and 12 July 2007, 65 000 jobs were lost due to 
closures within the private sector. Furthermore, of the data compiled by Gisha, it is 
evident that industries within the Gaza Strip are collapsing.
212
 Of the 3, 900 factories that 
produce food, pharmaceuticals, construction materials, wood, paper, craftwork, 
engineering material plastics, and rubber, more than 2 900 (75 per cent of the Gaza Strip’s 
factories) have ceased to produce. Since it was estimated that 85 per cent of the Gaza 
Strip’s residents are dependent on food aid, the sanctions imposed by Israel are sure to 
affect the general economic wellbeing of the Palestinian population.
213
 
This form of sanction may be deemed siege warfare. Well within the scope of military 
tactics, siege warfare has been stipulated within The Hague Regulations of 1907. Art 54 
of Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions does not however provide for a siege that results 
in the starvation of the population and prohibits the removal of structures that are vital to 
the civilian population. Though some may argue that a siege may be morally permissible 
in the face of necessity, it is commonly understood that civilians are ensured exit from the 
besieged area at will. Civilians therefore retain the right to be refugees. Israel’s blockade 
in co-ordination with the closing of the Rafah crossing by the Egyptian government does 
not constitute legal sanctions against Hamas. The blockade of the Gaza Strip places 
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citizens in an inhumane situation, and legalizes the otherwise illegal act of targetting 
civilians.
214
 
4.4.2.1 Effectiveness of sanctions  
 
Generally, the most notable issue with the imposition of sanctions is the inability or 
unwillingness of those who control the institutions of IHL. It is therefore common 
practice that sanctions that are imposed are deemed lenient toward the perpetrators.
215
 
This results in a discrepancy between the theory of IHL and critical action, more 
emphatically violating legal obligation. Jurisdiction for violations of IHL, begin with the 
state. The state is therefore entrusted with the task of upholding the legal requirements of 
IHL and to prosecute those who violate it. Secondly, third party states may also play an 
effective role in the implementation and protection of IHL. This falls within the scope of 
universal competence. In the event that these two divisions are unable to or unwilling to 
fulfil the duties established under IHL, the responsibility is generally accepted by the 
internationally community which has established various sanction mechanisms. These 
sanctions include the establishment of ad hoc international criminal courts.
216
  
Despite the Fourth Geneva Conventions of 1949 requiring the implementation of 
sanctions by State Parties against those who violate IHL, there is discrepancy with regards 
to how and to what extent such sanctions should be implemented by the state. States may 
impose sanctions using one of two mediums. The first, ‘administrative sanctions’, is 
imposed by the administrative superior. Secondly, military or judicial courts may impose 
the sanctions. States are therefore obligated to: established penal laws protecting IHL, 
punish those who violate the laws, take the necessary steps to discontinue any actions 
which are in violation of IHL, and finally to respect the perpetrators right to a fair trail. 
The problem with such institutionalization of IHLs is the fact that the courts and judges 
are ill equipped in dealing with such grave violations of law. Secondly, courts may not 
function during hostilities. Furthermore, where penal sanctions are enforced, little scope is 
provided for judicial review. IHL has therefore provided states with too large a range of 
duties with regard to grave violations of IHL. Importantly the role of national courts in the 
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prosecution of perpetrators of IHL results in limiting the scope of investigations and due 
compensation for victims.
217
  
Despite the continued violation of IHL in various parts of the world, the 
institutionalization of bodies obligated toward the protection of the said laws has not 
proven to be effective. Where national bodies have only marginally prosecuted 
perpetrators, the international community too has been unsuccessful. International courts 
have been unable to expedite trials and are often unsuccessful in prosecuting the main 
prosecutors. Furthermore, states have generally been forced to withdraw their support of 
the prosecution of perpetrators due to political and diplomatic pressures.
218
 Importantly, 
the notion of an international body entrusted with the duty to protect IHL too is flawed. 
The first issue is evident in the establishment of ad hoc courts. Where courts are 
established, the courts need to have the means to fulfil its task and the capacity to 
pronounce sanctions. Also, the requirements of IHL must be taken into account when 
institutionalizing the sanctions. Furthermore, the necessary resources need to be made 
available to these institutions. 
219
 
In consideration of sanctions against violations of IHL, it is inadequate to consider mere 
condemnation of these acts as a form of sanction, since it does not efficiently affect the 
military powers of the world.
220
  
4.4.3 Increased Pressure on Egypt 
 
In view of the 2011 revolution in Egypt it is evident that an emphatic call by 
Egyptians may be viewed as an end to the 1979 Peace Treaty between Egypt and 
Israel. In violation of the basic ‘Arab tenets’, Egypt witnessed its ousting form the 
Arab world under the leadership of President Sadat. This policy has framed much of 
the political diaspora of Egyptian politics. Solidary with Palestine is a clear facet of a 
stable Egypt. The Egyptian revolution has thus acted as a reminder that although 
governments may know how to deal with other governments, may know how to use 
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their military against another state or country, and they may know how to use their 
relations in order to enforce their interests, they, however, are not always in a position 
to know and foresee the actions of a unified mass of citizens striving to enforce their 
rights. This was emphasized by an Israeli MP when he stated that ‘with Mubarak we 
could talk business; (but) with these masses we don’t know how to talk.’221 This 
suggests that speaking of a mass of citizens is one thing, but to speak of a mass of 
Arab Muslims, who are characterized mainly by their hate of Zionism, is another. 
Israel has, therefore, made the assertion that even though neither Israel nor Palestine 
was directly on the agenda throughout the revolution, the revolution has to an extent 
caused a destabilization of Israeli public opinion. The general opinion generated 
through the Israeli media consequently forced the Israeli government to reassure 
citizens that there is no need to fear an Egyptian military onslaught.
222
 
 
In order to understand whether the military or the current Egyptian leadership will 
continue Mubarak’s policy, it is important to keep track of Egyptian policy 
subsequent to the revolution. During the revolution it seemed as though the army 
worked hand in hand with the citizens, especially the techno-friendly youth, in order 
to successfully rid Egypt of Mubarak. Yet, after the dismissal of Mubarak, it seems 
that the military adopted the same defining characteristics of the Mubarak regime. 
This was evident in the subjecting of female detainees to humiliating virginity tests, 
by the shooting of two protesters, the killing of others in Tahrir Square in early April 
2011, and finally the arresting of journalists. This onslaught against civilians acts as 
proof that the military through its power has successfully maintained the same 
standard of leadership as its predecessors.  The actions of the military following the 
revolution have resulted in the termination of the alliance between the youth and the 
military, consequently leaving Egypt uncertain of its intended democratic reform.
223
 
The influence of Egypt, therefore, is dependent on the opinion of the public in relation 
to the governing authority, the governing body being the influencing factor of foreign 
policy.  
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With the new challenges that face the people of Egypt as a result of the revolution, 
one very important issue, the liberation of the Palestinians, is sure to be at the 
forefront of further negotiation.
224
 This is emphasized by the newly formulated 
requests by the Qatari government for Palestinian legitimacy. Based on its 1967 
border, the government of Qatar would require the support of Egypt in its attempt to 
encourage the legitimization of Palestine on the world stage. Along with Qatar, the 
Palestinian government itself has requested the recognition of Palestine as an 
independent state in the UN in an attempt to build international concern for the plight 
of Palestine, which would subsequently place pressure on Israel to change its 
treatment of Palestinians. Egypt is regarded as one of the most influential Arab states 
in its relations with the US, the lack of Egyptian support for Palestine has become a 
pivotal area of concern. The US administration has vowed to veto any request for 
Palestinian legitimacy, rather requesting another round of talks between Israel and 
Palestine.
225
  
 
Though Israel has the support of the US, it remains imperative that the Israeli 
authority now weighs the importance of the 1979 Treaty in its national security. This 
would entail that it assess their situation 40 years ago, as well as the understanding by 
the state that Israel’s prosperity to date is in part dependent on it’s Treaty with Egypt. 
If Egypt wishes to maintain its current security, it would require the shift of power 
from the Mubarak regime to the next generation of military officers instead of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, which currently maintains its credibility within Egypt. It is 
therefore apparent that if the Treaty with Egypt were of utmost importance to the 
maintenance of Israel’s security, it would stand to reason that the Israelis would do 
everything in their power to preserve the Treaty. The preservation of the 1979 Treaty 
may therefore require Israel’s adjustment of its previous policies, including the 
surrendering of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. However, since the controlling of 
Hamas in the Gaza Strip was in the interest of both Egypt and Israel, it would be 
understandable that even after the revolution the new military power would keep 
intact the control of the Gaza Strip by Israel. In the event that a new uprising, one that 
is more radically ‘Islamist’, was to occur, Israel would certainly have to rethink its 
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policy. In this instance an ideological settlement would thus outweigh a political 
one.
226
 
 
Furthermore, it has become evident that public opinion of both Egyptians and its 
surrounding Arab nations in opposition of Israel has strengthened. This has become 
apparent in the attacking of the Israeli embassy in Cairo by Egyptian protestors, thus 
acting as an indication that no Egyptian government would be able to legitimately 
maintain cordial relations with Israel, unless Israel recognizes the plight of the 
Palestinian people.
227
 Israel’s recognition of the opinion of the new generation of 
Egyptians toward its future relations with Egypt was clearly demonstrated when they 
ordered diplomats and their families to leave Egypt.
228
 This included the closure of 
the Israeli embassy, as well as the removal of the Israeli flag in an attempt to 
eliminate any further incitement against Israel by protestors. As a result of the attack 
on the Israeli embassy, the Egyptian military has since provided some leverage by 
opening up the Rafah crossing which separates Egypt and the Gaza Strip. This does 
not however imply that the Egyptian authorities will continue to comply with public 
opinion in the future. It is thus difficult to foresee the survival of the 1979 Peace 
Treaty, since the uprising has made it clear that all Arab nations are not marching 
toward ‘moderation’ with regards to their interests, nor with regard to the state of 
Israel. They have for many years stood by as their leaders maintained relations with 
Israel, but have found the strength to protest in an effort to have their voices heard. 
Public opinion may therefore affect the future of the 1979 Treaty and consequently 
affect Israel’s policy toward Palestinian civilians and land.229  
4.4.3.1 The Exporting of Natural Gas to Israel 
 
Despite Egypt’s law regarding the importing of Israeli goods, Israel’s imports of 
Egyptian goods have grown to USD 355 million in 2011.
230
  These exports are, 
however, mainly concentrated on one product: natural gas that is supplied by East 
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Mediterranean Gas (EMG). The gas is supplied via a pipeline across the Sinai 
Peninsula founded by Hussein Salem and Israel Mehav Group, owned by Yossi 
Maimen, along with the Egyptian government who owns 10 per cent stake. Salem 
during 2008, sold 37 per cent of his stake, left with 28 per cent, he sold 25 per cent to 
PTT, Thailand’s national oil company, and the remaining 12 per cent to American 
business, while Merhev’s stake declined from 25 per cent to 20.6 per cent. Salem 
however fled Egypt on the fall of the Mubarak regime. The state subsequently froze 
his and his family’s assets. In 2008 however EMG signed a 20 year contract with 
Israel, thus continuing to become the largest source of fuel for the Israeli economy,
231
 
much of which is supplied to Israel’s Electric Corporation (IEC), which is in the 
process of converting its electric supply system to natural gas, a cheaper and cleaner 
option.  Proof of Israel’s reliance on Egypt’s gas supply is evident in the fact that 
Israel was the recipient of 40 per cent of the IEC’s generation at the beginning of 
2011, which was powered by natural gas, 35 per cent being supplied by Egypt, 15 per 
cent of total production.
232
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his and his family’s assets. In 2008 however EMG signed a 20 year contract with 
Israel, thus continuing to become the largest source of fuel for the Israeli economy,
234
 
much of which is supplied to Israel’s Electric Corporation (IEC), which is in the 
process of converting its electric supply system to natural gas, a cheaper and cleaner 
option.  Proof of Israel’s reliance on Egypt’s gas supply is evident in the fact that 
Israel was the recipient of 40 per cent of the IEC’s generation at the beginning of 
2011, which was powered by natural gas, 35 per cent being supplied by Egypt, 15 per 
cent of total production.
235
 
 
4.4.3.2 The Role of the Suez Canal     
 
Besides the trade in goods, Egypt and Israel have developed trade links through 
services.
236
 One important such business link is the Suez Canal
237
, which provides a 
shipping route for 20 per cent of Israeli goods; thus any interruptions in the use of the 
water way would have clear effects on Israeli shipping companies.
238
 The Egyptian 
ports of Alexandria, Damietta, and Port Saud have developed into trans-shipment 
ports where large ships off-load goods which are then placed on smaller ships to 
Israel and other Mediterranean countries. Despite the important role of the Sinai with 
regard to maritime trade, if the shipping flow of the Sinai were to be disrupted, ports 
in Turkey and Israel would benefit.
239
  
 
The Canal has been closed to shipping traffic five times in history, the final time in 
June 1975. Most notably it was closed between June 1967 and June 1975, due to the 
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Israeli and Egyptian war.
240
 The closure of the Suez Canal proved to affect a vast 
number of industries. The closure of the Suez Canal would entail large insurance 
costs, as companies would now have to make concessions for vast areas of 
unprotected waters prone to piracy. Companies would also have to fork out 
increasingly large sums on fuel costs and travel costs for crew members. They would 
therefore be required to carefully determine which contracts are worthwhile.
241
 
 
On 26 July 1956, the Suez Canal Company Nationalization Law was established. The 
laws pertaining to the Suez Canal assert that the Suez Maritime Canal Company is not 
nationalized by the Egyptian government. All rights, money and obligations were 
therefore to be transferred to the state of Egypt, consequently calling for the 
dissolution of all organizations and committees previously operating the company. All 
shareholders were to be compensated for the value of their shares on the Paris stock 
market.
242
 Furthermore, the management of the Suez Canal traffic utility was handed 
to the Ministry of Commerce. The said body has an independent budget to be decreed 
by the President, which is to commence on July 1 and end on the June 30 of every 
year. 
243
 It is therefore clear that the control of the Suez Canal in the hands of the 
Egyptian authority grants Egypt a bargaining tool for the changing of Israeli policy 
for the Occupied Palestinian Territories. 
4.5 Conclusion  
 
As mentioned above, Section III of the Convention asserts the freedom of movement; 
freedom from mass deportation; access to housing, food, hygiene, healthcare, 
education, and safety; and non-separation of family members.
244
 After close analysis 
it is found that the duties of the occupying power as set forth by the Fourth Geneva 
Convention have not been respected. The duty of the occupying power furthermore 
establishes the rights of the occupied. These rights as enshrined in Part II of the 
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Fourth Geneva Convention have proven to be violated.
245
 Consequently, the means by 
which IHL may be respected have been highlighted. The ICC’s jurisdiction allows for 
its intervention in matters relating to the Occupied Territories.
246
 The body should 
therefore assert its authority in proceedings that may result in the implementation of 
the duties of the occupying power. Furthermore, the use of economic sanctions plays 
a vital role in exerting pressure on governments. Israel’s losses in its agricultural 
sector as a result of international sanctions in the form of BDS acts as proof that it is 
an effective method to encourage stringent implementation of IHL.  
 
The continued blockade of the Gaza Strip by Israel as a means to place pressure on 
Hamas violates the basic rights of the citizens of the Gaza Strip. Consequently, the 
continued sanctions of Israel may encourage Israel to end the blockade. The mere 
condemnation against the blockade is therefore not sufficient. Though Egypt holds 
considerable economic bargaining tools, it does not appear likely that the Egyptian 
authorities may intervene in the conflict. It is therefore imperative that the UN as the 
only viable body act in accordance with the Resolution discouraging the continued 
violations of IHL.  
 
Chapter 5 will discuss IHL violations within the Occupied Palestinian Territories.  
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CHAPTER 5 
IHL VIOLATIONS WITHIN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN 
TERRITORIES  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will outline the various IHL violations that have occurred within the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories. Focussing on only selected violations, Chapter 5 
will argue that IHL and IHRL have been completely disregarded. 
 
IHL regulating the legal system governing the occupied population asserts the notion 
that the legal system of the occupied territory remains intact. This principle reflects 
the temporary nature of occupation, as well as amplifying the role of ‘occupier’ as 
distinct from ‘sovereign’. The lives of those who reside within the Occupied Territory 
should therefore remain unaltered, as it was prior to the occupation.
247
 This is clearly 
stipulated under Art 64(1) of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which states that ‘the 
penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force’.248 The provision however 
allows for the ‘suspension’ of the penal laws by the occupying power in cases in 
which the laws constitute a threat to security or they act as an obstacle to the 
application of the Fourth Geneva Convention. 
249
 Art 43 of The Hague Regulations 
similarly emphasizes this view.
250
 Therefore, if the penal laws of the occupied 
territory do not constitute a threat to the security, the laws are to remain intact, so too 
emphasizing the fact the lives of those residing within an occupied territory remain 
unaltered.  
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5.2 Actions Against Civilians and Civilian Objects that are in Contravention 
of the Fourth Geneva Conventions  
5.2.1 Illegal Arrests  
 
The second military order issued on 7 June 1967, proclaimed that Israel had occupied 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, taking control of the administrative duties of the 
territory. This Israel asserts was done ‘in the interests of security and public order’.251 
Though more than 25 000 military orders exist today, with the inclusion of 
amendments, a compilation of the laws governing those occupied within the Occupied 
Territories was only made available to the public in the 1980s. It should be noted that 
these laws govern Palestinian citizens and not Israeli settlers.
252
 This is asserted in Art 
78 and Art 81 of the Israeli Military Order 378 that provides that an Israeli soldier 
retains the power to search premises, as well as arrest individuals upon suspicion 
without the issuing of a warrant.
253
 In 1999 it was found that an estimated 200 000 
individuals, who comprised 20 per cent of the Palestinian population, had been 
imprisoned in Israeli prisons. The powers granted to soldiers makes possible the 
stopping of any person at the request of the soldier, whose right is then extended to 
the entering and searching of Palestinian homes. These individuals may then be 
arrested without any cause provided. This is emphasized in Art 85 of the Military 
Order that states that the military commander of any area may restrict the movements 
and activities of individuals, including issuing their confinement to a specific area or 
their place of residence.
254
 Furthermore, Arts 78 and 87 of the Military Order provide 
that the court may order the detention of individuals for six months without trial, 
referred to as administrative detention.
255
 These individuals may be imprisoned for an 
extended period without the issuing of a new arrest warrant.
256
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With the arrest of groups of individuals, generally as a result of protests, courts have 
made use of ‘quick trials’.257 In many instances these cases are brought before the 
court before the detainees have had an opportunity to meet with their lawyers, or 
before their family members have been notified of their arrest. The accused are in 
some cases presented with a lighter sentence if they agree to admit to the crime(s). 
Such cases were prevalent during the 1980s in which individuals, aged 13-21, were 
tried. Though Military Order 29 does allow for the legal representation of the accused, 
it is at the discretion of the prison commander.
258
 Furthermore, the lawyer of the 
accused may only obtain access to the accused once interrogation has been completed. 
The accused are generally granted a judgment based on a confession. The confession 
is in most cases written in Hebrew, a language that is not understood by a large 
percentage of Palestinians. Furthermore, judgments handed down by military courts 
are not subject to appeal. The accused may only make a plea for mercy to the military 
governor of the area in which they reside. This plea will not release the accused from 
a jail sentence or a fine.
259
  
5.2.1.1 Illegal Arrest of Minors 
 
Despite the fact that both international and Israeli law prohibits the arrest and 
detainment of minors, approximately 700 Palestinian children under the age of 18 are 
prosecuted annually.
260
 These children are generally charged with the throwing of 
stones, which under military law is punishable by up to 20 years imprisonment. 
Currently 176 children are imprisoned, and are to be tried as adults once they reach 16 
years of age. Children within the Israeli prison system are subjected to torture, solitary 
confinement, and overcrowded cells, to name but a few violations. 
261
 
 
It has been noted by Issa that between January 2013 to July 2013 170 children have 
been arrested.
262
 These arrests have been said to take place at night in the 
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neighbourhoods of Tur, Silwan, and the Old City.  Both the arrest of children, as well 
as the house arrest imposed on some of them, changes the dynamics of their 
childhood. In most cases these arrests strip away their right to access education, as 
well as disrupting their family life. It came to light that these children, who are 
arrested under abnormal circumstances, find themselves suffering from psychological 
and mental trauma, as well as hair loss. These problems are said be a result of the 
inability of the parents to protect their children, who are left at the mercy of the 
military courts. Issa further notes that these children, once arrested, are exposed to 
methods of psychological and physical torture in an attempt to have them confess to 
the throwing of stones.
263
  
 
Cases in which children have been arrested for the throwing of stones have been 
evident throughout the years following the affirmation of occupation in 1967. One 
such case was submitted to the High Court of Israel in 1983.  Three 13-year-old girls 
were brought before the Court after being accused of throwing stones at a 
‘mechanized' patrol of the security forces’. Though Israeli law regarding the trial of a 
minor obliges the court to provide a defence lawyer for the individual, military law 
under a military government deems otherwise. The girls without a defence lawyer 
were faced with: a military prosecutor, a witness for the prosecution, and Judge 
Hanoch Keinan.  In the absence of a defence lawyer, under Israeli law, the judge has 
to aid in the interrogation of the witnesses. 
264
 
 
The girls, though they did not admit that they were guilty of the charge, were fined. 
One of the girls were fined 700 000 Israeli pounds, whilst the two sisters, were fined a 
total of 1 million pounds. Judge Keinan ordered that the fines be paid within seven 
days of the judgment. In the event that the fines are not paid, the judge ordered that 
the fathers of the girls be imprisoned for six months. As noted earlier, no appeal is 
granted against these judgments. The sentence may only be annulled or reduced by 
appeal to the High Court of Justice. In handing down the judgment against the girls, 
the Judge had made no inquiry about the family of the girls. It had later been 
understood that the father of the girl fined 700 000 pounds was chronically ill and 
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only worked two days a week as a baker. Considered destitute, he was in no position 
to pay the fine. In the appeal to the High Court (194/83) it was argued that: ‘This is 
not justice but injustice, the judge may fine the father but not send him to jail’, and 
lastly, the judge had a duty, which he did not fulfil, to summon the father and hear 
him, and not send him to prison in absentia’. The HCJ ordered the postponement of 
the implementation of the sentence. 
265
 
5.2.1.2 Prolonged Periods of Detention 
 
From the Six Day War (1967) to the first Intifada (1988), over 600 000 Palestinians 
were held captive in Israeli prisons for one week or more. Estimates showed that at 
one time one-fifth of the Palestinian population have spent time in an Israeli prison. 
Though numbers declined in 1998 and 1999, the second Intifada, which began in the 
year 2000, witnessed an influx of Palestinians taken into Israeli captivity, increasing 
from less than 20 from 1999 to October 2001 to more than 28 000 in April 2003.
266
 
By 2007, there were on average 830 Palestinians under administrative detention, 
inclusive of women and children below the age of 18. In 2008, more than 8400 
Palestinians were held by Israeli civilian and military authorities, of which 5148 were 
serving sentences. The remaining 2167 were facing legal proceedings and 790 were 
under administrative detention. Many of these prisoners were not informed of the 
charges against them. Furthermore, statistics have shown that between 2000-2009, 
Israeli prisons housed 6700 Palestinians between the ages of 12 and 18, 423 of whom 
were held in Israeli detention and interrogation centres.
267
 There are currently 25 
prisons and military detention camps in which Palestinians are being held. Of these, 
four are interrogation centres, 20 are located outside of occupied the Gaza Strip and 
the West Bank.
268
 
 
Estimates show that since the beginning of the occupation an estimated 10 000 
Palestinian women have been arrested and/or detained. After arrest they are 
transferred to one of two prisons: Damon or Hasharon-Telmond Prison, located 
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outside of the 1967 Occupied Territories. This is in direct contravention of Art 76 of 
the Fourth Geneva Convention. Both prisons are known for their actions against 
Palestinian female prisoners, which include the forced stripping of clothes in front of 
prison guards, being subjected to brutal body searches, and the firing of tear gas into 
cells. Furthermore, it has been found that many female arrests had been ordered as a 
means of pressurizing their husbands into confessing. 
269
 
 
Palestinian activist have accused Israeli authorities of neglecting to recognize 
Palestinian prisoners as having the status of prisoners of war. This was emphasized in 
July 2003 by the International Federation for Human Rights. The Israeli military sets 
the standard of detention that allows for the imprisonment of an individual for up to 
six months, which may be extended without the approval of a judge. Given that 
evidence is inaccessible, the requirement of fair trial proceedings has not been met. 
Furthermore, until the 1990s Palestinian prisoners were held in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip, but thereafter they were held in Israeli territory.
270
 Such movement of 
prisoners, in breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention, violates the right of detainees 
to be held in occupied territories during all stages of detention, as well as being 
granted the right to serve the duration of their sentences in the occupied territory if 
convicted.
271
 Though human rights group Yesh Din have protested against this 
conduct, the Supreme Court of Israel has rejected their petition.
272
  
 
With regards to the right to a fair trial, it was found that Israeli officials detained 
prisoners for prolonged periods without charge or trial. Such conduct that Israel 
justifies, as being a mere security measure used to avoid exposing confidential 
information in trials, is a widely criticized policy.
273
 Furthermore, the Defence 
Minister has the right to order administrative detention for up to six months in cases 
where a person poses a possible security threat, an order that may be renewed. 
Administrative detention is the practice by which individuals are sent to prison 
without trail, or the continuation of imprisonment following the completion of a 
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prison sentence.
274
 Within the areas of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank any local 
commander can issue an administrative order, which is valid for six months. In its 
defence of the use of administrative detention, Israel makes reference to Art 78 of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention, which states: “If the occupied power considers it 
necessary, for imperative reasons of security to take safety measures concerning 
protected persons, it may at the most, subject them to assigned residence or to 
internment”.275  
5.2.2 Demolition of Homes 
 
Since the beginning of the occupation the demolition of homes has been one of the 
main characteristics of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. A fact was made evident in the 
1968 annual report of the ICRC in which it is stated:  
 
‘The International Committee delegates in Israel repeatedly petitioned the Israeli 
civilian and military authorities to cease these practices which are contrary to Art 33, 
53 and 147 of the IV Geneva Convention and to ask for the reconstruction of the 
houses or for financial compensation to be paid’.  
 
Art 53 of the Convention clearly prohibits any destruction of ‘real or personal 
property belonging individually or collectively to private persons…except where such 
destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations.’ 276  It is the 
opinion of the ICRC that the phrase ‘military operations’ be understood as: 
‘Movement, maneuvers, and other actions taken by the armed forces with a view to 
fighting’. 277  This explanation therefore indicates that the destruction of property 
cannot be regarded as falling within the scope of Art 53 of the Convention since it is 
not ‘absolutely necessary’. Contravention of this provision was clearly evident in the 
1980s in cases in which the demolition of a home in many instances was the direct 
result of an allegation of stone throwing by one or more members of a family.  
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Relevant to the discussion of house demolitions is a 1982 case in which a boy, aged 
16, had been accused of throwing stones, only to find that his home would be 
demolished the very next day.
278
 The following is an account of the events 
surrounding the demolition of the family’s home by the boy’s father, George Mickael 
Comsieh: 
 
‘On 14 November 1982, at 2:00 a.m., a number of Israeli Soldiers rushed into our 
house and began to search. They did not find anything. They then said that they 
wanted my son Waleed who is a 16-year-old school student. They took him with them 
to the police station in Jerusalem [known as] the Russian compound. The following 
night, we were surprised to see a large number of Israeli soldiers enter the house with 
an army officer. The officer told me to listen and began reading an order, which stated 
that they wanted to abolish our house because our son, Waleed, had been accused of 
throwing stones at an Israeli patrol. We were given 30 minutes to evacuate our house. 
We were surprised and could not do much in half an hour, as most of the family was 
still asleep. The soldiers began throwing some the furniture out of the house causing a 
lot of it to break. The rest of the furniture remained in the house. The soldiers placed 
explosives and blew up the house. So, in a few minutes, my house, which was 14 
metres by 14 metres with two floors, and on each floor there were four nice rooms, a 
sitting room, a veranda, a bathroom and a kitchen, had been destroyed. This quick 
action did not give us the opportunity to ask the injunction at the High Court of 
Justice. I believe this action is against any human law. This house does not belong to 
my son but is my property, and now the whole family is in need of a home to live 
in.’279 
 
Following the demolition of the home, the military governor granted permission for 
the rebuilding of Mr. Comsieh’s home. The family stayed in a tent as a result of the 
demolition, which after gaining much publicity was subsequently burned down. The 
son was tried and convicted of throwing petrol bombs and sentenced to three and a 
half years in prison. The case of Mr. Comsieh and his family illustrates that this 
method of punishment is in contravention of Art 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention 
in its prohibition of collective punishment. Furthermore, there is the fact that ‘no 
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protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has not personally 
committed’. 280 
 
Following mass house demolitions, a petition was brought before the HCJ on 14 June 
2005 by human rights organizations and Palestinian residents.
281
 The petition was 
aimed at bringing to an end the demolition of homes in the areas of Judea, Samaria, 
and the Gaza Strip. The petitioners argued that Art 53 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention and Art 23(g) of The Hague Regulations had been contravened by the 
military. The respondents
282
 requested that the petition be ignored. Their argument 
was based on the fact that the petition is ‘general’ and ignores the security 
circumstances within the areas, and that the areas under discussion are fuelled by 
hostilities and therefore require the methods used by the armed forces. Furthermore, 
they stated that it is not within the jurisdiction of the Court to determine which 
methods are used to defuse hostilities. The respondents further stated that the IDF 
takes necessary steps to respect the principle of proportionality, taking care that the 
civilians have left the premises before demolition takes place. A practice that is based 
on the cessation of hostilities by Israel at the conference of 8 February 2005 in Sharm 
el-sheikh in which the Prime Minister stated that Israel would stop its military activity 
against the Palestinians in every place the petition was regarded as moot. 
283
 
5.2.2.1 Demolition as a Means to Colonisation  
 
It has been argued that the demolition of homes has been a direct result of Israel’s 
wish to increase its settlements within the West Bank. This policy has been accepted 
by all Israeli administrations after 1967.
284
 Evidence of Israel’s wish to increase 
settlements is the fact that in 1967 only 250 Jewish settlements had been constructed 
within the West Bank and were only found within Nablus. This number has increased 
to over 300, 000 and has now spread throughout the West Bank. It is unofficially 
noted that since occupation began land confiscation in the West Bank amounted to: 41 
per cent in 1984, 60 per cent in 1991, and 71 per cent in 1998. Today, as a result of 
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limited space it has been found that the area allotted for the expansion of settlements 
is decreasing. Since the 1970s the Israeli military authorities have posted notices in 
the Arabic press announcing the preparation of plans with an opportunity to object. 
With the exclusion of exceptional cases, no objections by Palestinians have been 
successful. This process of the annexation of land by the Israeli government is 
referred to by the World Zionist Organization as ‘seizure’ of land.285  
 
In a much more obvious manner the Israeli government has barred Palestinians from 
what is regarded as ‘state’ land, thereby depriving Palestinians of large portions of the 
West Bank. State land may only be rented or built upon by one of the following 
categories: an Israeli citizen; one who has immigrated (to Israel) under the (Israeli) 
law of return; one who is entitled to the status of immigration under the law of return; 
and a company controlled by the mentioned categories.  Those outside the scope of 
this definition are referred to as ‘alien persons’. It has therefore become apparent from 
the mere siting of a bulldozer on Palestinian property that land confiscation has taken 
place. These actions are carried despite the fact that Palestinians have owned the land 
and homes for generations. Residents therefore reside within their villages and homes 
under the impression that they are the rightful owners of the land.
286
 
 
Furthermore, it is found that the reason for the demolition of a home occurs in the 
absence of a building permit for the construction of the home. The general procedure, 
which has remained unchanged for the past 20 years, by which permits are granted, is 
said to have resulted in the current situation. It has been found that from the Oslo talks 
until 2006 not a single permit in area C has been granted.
287
 As a result of the constant 
demolition of homes it has been recorded that approximately 14 500 people have been 
left homeless since 1987, of whom 6 000 are children. A further 5 000, 2 000 of 
whom are children, have been rendered homeless since Oslo II.
288
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The demolition of homes in the Occupied Palestinian Territories has been found to be 
in contravention of the provisions of the ICCPR and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).  The right to housing being a basic 
need of each individual, is central to the enjoyment of other human rights enshrined in 
Art 11(1) of the ICESCR which states:  
 
‘The State Parties to the Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate 
standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and 
housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions.
289
 The authorities 
will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right. Recognizing to this 
effect the essential importance of international co-operation based on free consent.’ 
 
This provision therefore emphasizes the fact that the right to have access to one’s 
home draws on the notion of living in a secure, peaceful and dignified establishment. 
Furthermore, the exclusion of Israeli Jews from the practice of house demolitions 
calls to attention the provision of Arts 2(1) and 26 of the ICCPR
290
 and Art 2(2) of the 
ICESCR.
291
  
 
These provisions provide that no individual should be discriminated against based on 
among other things: race, language, religion, political opinion, and social origin. This 
is emphasized in Art 5(e)(iii) of the International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) which stipulates that each individual 
enjoys the right to economic, social, and cultural rights, and in particular the right to 
housing.
292
 The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) 
formally announced the violation of the right to housing in March 1998 when it called 
for the “… halt to the demolition of Arab properties in East Jerusalem and for respect 
for property rights irrespective of the ethnic origin of the owner”,293 and expressed 
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concern “… about ethnic inequalities, particularly those centering upon what are 
known as “unrecognized” Arab villages [in Israel].”294 
 
5.2.3 Restricted Access to Basic Needs 
 
The process of land occupancy by the state of Israel has not only involved the 
appropriation of land, but has included the appropriation of the water resources of 
Palestine. These water resources are then deemed for use exclusively by Jewish 
settlers.
295
 This has been emphasized in 1987 by the State Comptroller of the Israeli 
government.
296
 The report stated that the Jewish water company, Mekorot, has drilled 
more than 40 deep-bore wells per year, pumping approximately 42 million cubic 
meters from the West Bank water supplies. Furthermore, it has been found that Israeli 
water wells are being constructed close to springs. This practice is not in conformity 
with the Jordanian water authority regulations as the springs act as irrigation for 
Palestinian agricultural land. The effect is evident in the northern areas of the Jordan 
valley in Bardala and ‘Ain El-Beida, in which all the springs belonging to Palestinian 
farmers have dried up. The farmers as result have suffered great loss. Mekorot agreed 
to supply the farmers with limited water, which left the farmers dependent on Israeli 
water supplies.
297
 
 
As a clear means to control the supply of water within the West Bank, Israel’s water 
commissioner stated in 1981 that the West Bank consumption for use by Palestinians 
will not exceed 100 million cubic meters annually. It has been estimated that by the 
year 1992 Israel had extracted its need of 1.8 million cubic meters of water annually 
from the West Bank ’s underground water supply. This water would then be sent to 
Israeli settlements within the Palestinian borders, as well as Israel proper. 
298
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5.2.4 Torture 
 
With regards to interrogation methods, the Israeli Shin Bet was permitted to make use 
of “moderate physical pressure” until 1999.299 The interrogation methods included 
binding prisoners in painful positions for a number of days so as to deprive him/her of 
sleep, playing loud music, and feeding the detainee insufficient quantities of food, to 
name but a few.
300
 The United Nations Committee against Torture (CAT) 
subsequently highlighted in 1997 that these actions were in violation of the CAT, 
which Israel ratified in 1991. This was again emphasized in September 1999, when 
Israel’s High Court ruled that the Israeli Security Agency (ISA) did not have legal 
authority to use physical means of interrogation that are not “reasonable and fair”. 
Such treatment may cause the detainee physical and mental suffering. The ruling 
came after 50 years of torture of Palestinian prisoners at the hands of Israeli 
authorities.
301
 Though the ruling makes clear the illegality of torture, there is evidence 
that torture, both physical and psychological, has taken place. With new forms of 
torture being used, Israeli authorities justify their actions. These new interrogative 
measures have been used by Israel’s General Security Service (GSS) in order to 
extract information. Since 1987, the GSS has interrogated over 850 Palestinians by 
means of torture, under the authority of both the army and the Supreme Court, which 
have approved, developed and supervised the torture.
302
 
 
As acts of solidarity and protest alike, hunger strikes were used as a means to address 
the treatment of prisoners. The most recent of these is the strike by Khader Adnan, 
who after being detained on 17 December 2011 embarked on a hunger strike against 
his alleged violent arrest. Adnan was subsequently released in April 2012 after fasting 
for 66 days. The demands of the protestors included: visits by family members, the 
release of extended solitary confinement inmates, and the release of those held under 
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administrative detention laws.
303
 These demands prove the absence of the basic rights 
of prisoners held within Israeli prisons. 
5.2.4.1 Restricted Access to Basic Needs as a Means of Torture  
 
The definition of torture is found in Art 1 of the UN CAT:  
 
‘Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third 
person, information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has 
committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a 
third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or 
suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of 
a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain 
or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.’304 
 
The ICCPR bans completely any act that is degrading and inhumane.
305
 Whilst the 
UNDHR of 1975 defines torture as ‘an aggravated form of cruel inhumane or 
degrading treatment’.306 
 
With regard to IHL the inflicted suffering does not have to be administered or 
instructed by an official.
307
 The action may therefore be done by/through an 
individual. Furthermore, the use of the word ‘act’ in this circumstance does not only 
entail physical actions but may also include the absence of action, or inaction. An 
example of this may be the forcible starvation of a population or individual. The term 
‘psychological torture’ may therefore relate to different aspects of the same act. It 
may, therefore, refer to methods used to inflict physical pain and suffering, as well as  
methods that are non-physical in nature but affect the mind of the individual. Non-
physical methods may include sleep deprivation, sensory deprivation, or witnessing 
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the torture of loved ones. The methods used by the state of Israel in its quest for 
settlements within the Occupied Territories therefore amount to acts of torture.
308
 
5.2.5 The Construction of the Wall  
 
Since the beginning of the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory, the government 
of Israel has attempted through various techniques to control and manage the 
movement of both Arabs and Jews. The most notable technique to date is the 
construction of a separation barrier that began in 2002. The barrier, described as an 
8m high fence, is meant to separate Israel proper from the West Bank. To Jews the 
wall is referred to as ‘Geder HaHafrada’ which means ‘security fence’, whilst Arabs 
refer to the barrier as ‘Jidar al-fasl al-unsun’ which means ‘racial segregation wall’. 
Internationally critics of the wall have commonly referred to the wall as the ‘apartheid 
wall’. 
 
Approximately 95 per cent of the structure of the wall consists of three layers of 
fence, two of which are mounted with barbed wire, the third lightly wired with 
intrusion detection technology. Either side of the fence is lined with patrol roads. The 
West Bank side of the fence has an anti-vehicle ditch.
309
 The rest of the wall, 
approximately 5 per cent, consists of concrete slabs, which are 8m high and 3m 
wide.
310
 The distance of the wall is expected to be at least 650km: the barrier is 
therefore planned to be four times as long and in certain areas twice as high as the 
Berlin Wall. These concrete walls are mostly found in urban areas, requiring less 
land, and because of the vulnerability of the area.
311
 The Israeli forces control access 
points along the wall and the fencing. Beyond the fencing the areas surrounding the 
wall are monitored by thermal imaging and video cameras, ‘unmanned aerial 
vehicles’, and sniper towers.312 
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5.2.5.1 The ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on the Construction of the Wall  
 
The in terms of Art 65(1) of its Statute may provide an advisory opinion. This is 
carried out in light of Art 96(1) of the Charter of UN that provides that the General 
Assembly may request the ICJ to give an advisory opinion on any legal question. The 
question of the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories was 
brought before the Court by the Member States under Resolution ES-10/2 of 25 April 
1997.  The request relates to issues that constitute a threat to international peace and 
security. Israel has however questioned the jurisdiction of the General Assembly. 
Furthermore, it asserted that the body acted ultra vires, and is therefore in violation of 
Art 12(1) that states:  
‘While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the 
functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make 
any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security 
Council so requests.’313 
The Court however considers that the general practice of the General Assembly 
seeking an advisory opinion did not contravene the provisions of Art 12(1) of the 
Charter.
314
 
The Court conceded to use the term ‘wall’ since the terms fence and barrier are no 
longer accurate in the physical sense. The extent of the wall to be examined is 
inclusive of both the Occupied Palestinian Territories and the area of East Jerusalem 
in relation to the demarcated area called the Green Line. The court asserts that the 
laws that govern the conflict include: the United Nations Charter, General Assembly 
Resolution 2625 (XX25), IHL, and human rights law. The Court holds that Art 2 (4) 
of the UN Charter includes the actions of Israel in the construction of the wall. Art 
2(4) states that:  
‘All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.’315 
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Furthermore, Resolution 2625 (XXV) emphasizes the notion of friendly relations and 
co-operation between states, subsequently, stating that:  
‘No territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognized 
as legal’.316 
With regard to IHL the Court acknowledges the fact that Israel is not party to the 
Hague Regulations. The Court does however note that the Hague Regulations have 
been defined as customary international law. The Court also asserts the fact that Art 
154 of the Fourth Geneva Convention is supplementary to SS ii and iii of the Hague 
Regulations. Though Israel has ratified the Fourth Geneva Convention in 1951, Israel 
continues to object to the applicability de jure of the Convention to the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories. Israeli authorities assert that the Art 2 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention is only applicable if two high contracting parties engage in conflict, 
further noting that on the occupation of Palestinian territory in 1967 Jordan was not in 
authority over the territory. The Court continued to assert that IHL is applicable in 
accordance with Art 2 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. With regard to IHRL, Israeli 
authorities assert that both the ICCPR and ICESCR do not apply in a conflict 
situation, furthermore, indicating that human rights treaties were established in an 
attempt to protect citizens from their own governments in times of peace.
317
 In a 
separate opinion Judge Buergenthal concludes that the Court’s findings that establish 
Israel as having violated IHL and IHRL are not sufficiently supported.
318
  
In contrast the Court found, in consideration of a previous case, that the protection of 
IHRL does not cease in times of war. This is based on Art 4 of the ICCPR that 
addresses non-derogable rights.
319
 The Court therefore stipulates that though there 
may exist situations that are purely matters of IHL or purely matters of IHRL. There 
are however situations which require both the assistance of international humanitarian 
and international human rights bodies. The Court concluded that the ICCPR and 
ICERSR are applicable to actions of a state acting against individuals outside of its 
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territory.
320
 The Court held, by 13 votes to 1, that erga omnes all states are 
responsible to respect to international law.  States are consequently responsible for the 
protection of IHL within the Occupied Palestinian Territories.
321
 
The Court found that the construction of the wall is an attempt to annex territory 
contrary to the set boundaries of 1967. This annexation of the land threatens the 
territorial sovereignty and self-determination of those boundaries.
322
 Israel has argued 
that the construction of the wall is for the purpose of protecting the territory of Israel 
proper form terrorist attacks that are launched from the West Bank , furthermore, 
asserted that the barrier is of a temporary nature, though not stipulating the time 
period for its existence. The Court however emphasized that the acquisition of land by 
means of force is a violation of IHL. In addition, the Court takes due recognition of 
Israel’s acceptance of a Palestinian people, consequently, acknowledging the right to 
self-determination of the Palestinian people. The Court notes that the wall is 
structured in such a manner as to include the majority of the settlement areas. This 
conclusion indicates that the occupying power is in contravention of Art 49(6) of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention.
323
 Despite the fact the Israeli forces have indicated that 
the barrier is of a temporary measure, the Court has asserted that the construction and 
the regime create a fait accompli since it may in future become a fixed structure.
324
  
The construction of the wall creates areas between itself and the Green Line that has 
resulted in enclaves. These enclaves have proven to inhibit the movement of the 
inhabitants of the Occupied Palestinian Territories, and secondly, affected the 
agricultural sector, access to healthcare, access to education, and access to water. The 
construction of the wall also restricts the ‘freedom to choose residence’. The 
continued construction of the wall will force Palestinians to depart from their areas of 
residence in an attempt not to be separated from their families. This migration may 
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result in an increase in Israeli settlement development. The Court therefore held that 
the construction of the wall impedes the freedom of movement of the inhabitants of 
the Occupied Palestinian Territories.
325
  
Furthermore, the construction of the wall impedes the rights to work, to healthcare, to 
education, and to an adequate standard of living as stipulated by both the ICESCR and 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. The Court concludes that 
the demographic changes as a result of the construction of the wall contravene Art 
49(6).
326
 Consequently, the construction may be assessed as not ‘rendered absolutely 
necessary by military operations’. Importantly, the Court notes that in acknowledging 
non-derogable rights, it finds that Israel by the construction of the wall did not respect 
the conditions as set forth by the derogable rights.
327
  
With regard to the path of the wall, it is indicated by the Court that it is not of 
absolute necessity to Israel’s security objectives. The route infringes on the rights of 
those residing within the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Though Israel invokes Art 
51 of the Charter of the United Nations, it does not constitute an adequate basis for 
the construction, since the threat stems from inside and not outside of its territories 
due to Israel’s control of the territory.328 
In a separate opinion, Judge Higgins notes that while he agrees that the Art 53 of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention is being violated by Israel with the construction of the 
wall, the Judge does not agree on the reasoning of the Court, asserting that the wall 
does not constitute a ‘serious impediment’ to the exercise of the Palestinian right to 
self-determination.
329
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5.2.5.2 Israel’s Justification for the Wall 
 
In a written statement to the ICJ in January 2004, the government of Israel relayed its 
justification for the construction of the separation barrier.
330
 The statement begins by 
stating that the situation within Israel is one in which the territory of Israel proper is 
faced with ongoing terrorist threats. The cases cited is the ‘Park Hotel attack’ in the 
town of Netanya in March of 2002 in which 30 people were killed and 145 were 
injured as a result of a suicide bombing by an individual from Tulkarem. Furthermore, 
there is the citing of 37 separate attacks in the same month of 2002 in which 135 
individuals were killed and 721 injured. The Israeli government asserts that with the 
increased security measures the number of attacks have declined, but have not 
stopped. This assertion made by Israeli authorities is based on a case in October 2003 
in which two families lost five family members each to a suicide bomber whilst 
dining at a restaurant in Haifa. A second case cited is a case where a woman stated 
that she was ill and had a prosthetic limb, and evaded Israeli security only to detonate 
a bomb that killed four Israelis. The statement furthermore asserts that in the 40 
months prior to the request for an advisory opinion, in total, suicide attacks by 
Palestinians have resulted in the death of 916 people and the injury to 5 000.
331
 
 
These actions by the Palestinian people are purported by the Israeli government to be 
acts of terrorism. As proof, Israeli authorities cite Security Council Resolution 1373 
(2001) in which acts of terrorism constitute a threat to international peace and 
security. Further, stating that the Resolution calls on all to denote acts of violence by 
refraining from ‘organizing, instigating, assisting and participating in terrorist acts’. 
The Israeli government asserts that the PLO, Fatah, and Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades 
have been behind many of the attacks, yet the ICJ at the request of the PLO is 
questioning the government of Israel.
332
 The state of Israel therefore asserts that the 
construction of the barrier is for the purpose of security, and is consistent with Art 51 
of the UN Charter as well as Security Council Resolution s 1368 (2001) and 1373 
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(2001) which rule that it is the inherent right of a state to defend itself.  The barrier 
constituted a non-violent method of defence.
333
 The Israeli government subsequently 
affirms that the barrier is not for the purpose of affecting the political diaspora with 
regard to the borders of the various territories. The authorities further indicate that the 
fence is of a temporary nature, which in light of a peace agreement will be removed, 
citing the removal of fences on its borders with Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon as 
examples.
334
  
 
 The assertion of self-defence is supported by Judge Buergenthal who a states that the 
Court’s conclusion on the construction of the wall is not well supported. The Judge 
finds that Israel’s continued need to protect itself from threats originating from within 
the Occupied Territories must be deemed to meet the requirements of Art 51 of the 
UN Charter.
335
    
5.2.5.3 Psychological Effects of the Wall 
 
The annexation of Palestinian land by the government of Israel evokes a sense of 
citizenship without its benefits, the Palestinian people having to unwillingly let go of 
their legal rights to property and land. The land in many instances is the economic 
source of sustenance. The annexation of land results in numerous changes affecting 
the quality of the lives of the Palestinian people. One such change is the psychological 
effects it may induce on a community level. In the first instance it is found that 
individuals, confined to their homes, within the confines of the family are excluded 
from the use of social support systems. On a second level, the individual is deprived 
of the support mechanism which their community provides through the annexation of 
the various areas. This reality has resulted in the division of communities; one section 
from the other. As a result of land annexation it was found in the area of Qalqiliya 
that many residents departed from the area back to their native village of Ras al-Tira 
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in an attempt to retain ownership of their land,
336
 This is due to the fact that the Israeli 
authorities in the absence of an owner on a piece of land may deem the land 'state 
property'. The native villages are generally departed by villages in search of economic 
freedom. It is therefore economically taxing on the individual to return to a land 
which holds no prospects of a future. As a consequence the rate of unemployment and 
poverty increases.
337
  
 
The border of the Ras al-Tira is surrounded by an electric fence that is opened at 
scheduled times. The school which is attended by children within Ras-al-Tira is based 
on the outskirts of the fence. Children attending the school, both enroute to school and 
returning home, therefore need to be on time for the scheduled opening of the gate. 
Students are consequently forced to miss school.  As a result the rate of absenteeism 
increases the illiteracy levels, and also a sense of powerlessness is created  by 
establishing a situation in which students stop attending school so as not to have to 
deal with the checkpoints. 
338
 
 
Between 2000 and 2004 the residents within the economy of Qalqilya increased their 
dependency on agriculture from 22 per cent to 45 per cent.
339
 This changed due to the 
lack of commercial goods being imported as well as the inability to travel beyond the 
wall. As a consequence, the confiscation of land by Israel makes it increasingly 
impossible for Palestinians to fend for their families, for those who own land on the 
outside of the fence find it difficult to access their land. Those who move back to their 
villages and harvest crops, subsequently find that the trading of their goods is made 
difficult through the various stringent laws. The area of Qalqilya acts as an example 
for the state of the Palestinian business certres.
340
 Having been the market certre for 
over 85 000 Palestinians from the West Bank and Israel per week, the market in 2004 
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was under threat of closure, as a result of merchants moving to villages with the 
construction of the wall. It was found that between 2002 and 2004 4500 residents left 
the area of Qalqilya for better conditions. The study conducted on Qalqilya showed 
the unemployment among those who were able to work to be 72 per cent. The 
situation within Qalqilyah has been dubbed ‘ghettoization’, since it is ridden with 
poverty and displacement.
341
 This discription of ‘ghettoization’ is based on the 
definition of the phenomenon by Walter Thabit: 
 
‘As a location designed to house, contain, and thin out entire groups of people deemed 
unwanted and parasitic by the powers that be, by isolating the people and giving them 
no jobs, education, and hope to move forward in life. Thabit also states ‘ghettos are 
created by the apartheid policies of white society.’ 342 
 
This definition rings true to the situation in Palestine in which residents are placed in 
dire circumstances not by poverty but rather as a result of policies enforced by the 
Israeli authorities. The closures and curfews create a sense of frustration, anger and 
insecurity, thus restricting the social and psychological advancement of people living 
under these circumstances. As a consequence, the rate of depression, suicide, and 
disassociation increases. Individuals are therefore only concerned with survival. This 
was displayed in a study conducted by the Palestinian Counselling Centre in 2003. 
The study surveyed 44 adult Palestinians aged 20-55 residing within the district of 
Qalqilya. The answers to the study identified five mental health issues: depression; 
anxiety; PTSD; somatization; and coping skills. Furthermore, it was found that much 
of the distress experienced is a result of the sense of being forgotten by the rest of the 
world, their problems unnoticed. A further 92 per cent indicated a sense of 
hopelessness for the future, whilst 52 per cent of the individuals wanted to end their 
lives. A further 91 per cent of the respondents indicated that they experience 
flashbacks of memory. Of those tested, 87 per cent of the respondents indicated that 
they experience headaches, whilst 82 per cent feel constant numbness and tingling 
feelings. Of the respondents, 70 per cent stated that they sometimes or always 
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experience trouble breathing, including heart and chest pains. Importantly, 81 per cent 
indicated that they sometimes or always feel helpless to the destruction of their 
property. 
343
 
The findings of the Court prove that the occupation by Israel is contrary to IHL and 
IHRL. Those residing within the Occupied Palestinian Territories do not have 
adequate access to: legal assistance; housing; healthcare; education; and water. 
Consequent to the construction of the wall, access to these basic human rights is 
further limited. The Court therefore concluded, by 14 votes to one, that the 
construction of the wall is contrary to international law. In addition, the Court asserts 
that reparations must as far as possible improve the consequences of the wall.
344
 Israel 
is therefore obligated to return the olive groves, land, and other immovable property 
seized as a result of the construction of the wall within the Occupied Territories. 
Consequently, Israel bears the responsibility to compensate any person who had 
suffered material damage. Importantly, the Court held, again by 14 votes to one, that 
the construction of the wall ceases in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, including 
in and around East Jerusalem. Furthermore, the Court asserted that all states recognize 
the illegality of the existence and further construction of the wall.
345
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5.3 Conclusion  
 
After close analysis of the IHL violations within the Occupied Palestinian Territories 
it is evident that the rights of the occupied have not been respected. Actions against 
civilians and civilian objects include of illegal arrests, illegal arrests of minors, 
prolonged periods of detention, demolition of homes, restricted access to basic needs, 
and torture. Furthermore, the construction of the separation wall places stringent 
limits on the residents within the Occupied Palestinian Territories and has proven to 
result in the collapse of social structures.
346
 Importantly, the continued actions carried 
out against civilians within the Occupied Territories have resulted in severe 
psychological problems. 
The final chapter will conclude the previous five chapters and will provide 
recommendations aimed at alleviating the affects of the conflict and achieving lasting 
peace.   
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 Conclusions 
 
This mini-thesis sought to establish that IHL violations have occurred within the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories during the years 1982-2012. Furthermore, the UN 
and its respective organs, the ICRC and the international community at large have not 
fulfilled their duty to protect the rights of the civilians caught within the international 
conflict between Israeli and Palestinian Forces. This mini-thesis concludes that IHL 
violations have occurred within the Occupied Palestinian Territories.  
 
With the partition and subsequent occupation violating the IHL of Palestine in the 
territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, numerous conflicts have occurred. 
With regards to the international bodies obligated to managing the implementation of 
IHL, it is evident that insufficient steps have been taken to protect civilian lives. The 
ICRC, though it has managed to address the various concerns within the Occupied 
Territories, has not been successful in the implementation of IHL regulations. Due to 
limited access to resources within the Occupied Palestinian Territories, the ICRC has 
been unable to assure that adequate medical supplies and healthcare is available. 
Furthermore, the UN, in its attempt to restore respect for the safety of civilians with 
the establishment of Resolution 181(1), Resolution 242, and the Oslo Accords has not 
made any advance in establishing respect for IHL in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories. Resolution 181(1), in its attempt to establish a two state solution, has to 
date not been realized. Consequently, the right to freedom of ‘transit’ and ‘visit’, and 
freedom from discrimination based on ‘race, religion, and language’ has been 
violated. The principle of self-determination advocated for within Resolution 181(1) 
has therefore been violated.
347
  
 
Secondly, Resolution 242, which advocates the inadmissibility of the acquisition of 
territory through war, has not been respected. Furthermore, the increased construction 
of settlements within the Occupied Palestinian Territories violates the essence of this 
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Resolution. Additionally, the acquisition of territory threatens the political 
independence of civilians residing within the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The 
state of ‘belligerency’ in its continued existence and rule over the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories has not been dismantled violating the terms of Resolution 
242.
348
 Thirdly, the terms of the Oslo Accords, though partially fulfilled with the 
handing over of the Gaza Strip to Palestinian authorities, have not been respected in 
their entirety. The basic amenities are therefore not accessible by the citizens of the 
Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Furthermore, the continued construction of settlements 
within Occupied Palestinian Territories is contrary to the terms of the Oslo Accords.  
 
The duties of the occupier relative to the protection of civilians in time of war have 
not been fulfilled.
349
 The improvement of the medical, education, and hygiene sectors 
is not adequate. Importantly, in an attempt to sanction Hamas, access to food supplies 
has been directly controlled by the occupier who only allows a percentage of food 
into the Gaza Strip. The courts of the occupying power do not support the right to a 
fair trial. Prisoners therefore generally have no access to members of their families. 
Furthermore, the protection of IHRL has not been fulfilled. This has been stipulated in 
the briefing of the ICJ. The illegal arrest of both adults and minors, prolonged periods 
of detention, the demolition of homes, restricted access to basic needs, torture, and the 
construction of a separation barrier all violate the laws of IHL.  
 
In its fact-finding mission into the situation in the Gaza Strip, the UN had concluded 
that Art 5 crimes of the Rome Statute had been committed. Crimes against humanity, 
stipulated in Art 7, included: persecution and intentionally causing great suffering. It 
was stipulated that individuals within Palestine are deprived of their sustenance, 
employment, housing, water, and freedom of movement. In the case of Israel it was 
found that Palestinian armed groups had fired rockets from the Gaza Strip that 
constitute ‘indiscriminate attacks upon the civilian population of southern Israel’. War 
crimes (Art 8) included willful killing and torture.
350
 Evidence of war crimes was 
found in the targetting of a mosque, the killing of members of the al-Samouni family, 
the severe treatment and beatings of prisoners, and the attack on and destruction of the 
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Gaza Prison and the Palestinian legislative council building. The firing of rockets into 
southern Israel by Palestinians was considered a war crime as well.
351
  
 
War crimes relative to the Fourth Geneva Convention included collective penalties; 
attacks against hospitals; and attacks against the civilian population.
352
 The UN fact-
finding mission held that the declaration intending to maintain the blockade of the 
Gaza Strip until the release of Gilad Shalit made by the Israeli authorities is to be 
considered a war crime. Furthermore, it concluded that the detention of legislative 
council, and the attacks against the Grand Mosque (Masjid al-Quds), the Al-Wafa 
hospitals, and the UNRWA compound with the use of white phosphorous were to be 
considered contraventions of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The UN Fact-Finding 
Mission clearly demonstrated that Art 5 of the Rome Statute relative to crimes within 
the jurisdiction of the ICC and the Fourth Geneva Convention had been 
contravened.
353
 
6.2 Recommendations 
 
In order to establish lasting peace that will be in favour of all parties to the conflict 
important measures need to be established. First, the ICC in an attempt to grant 
Palestinian authorities a voice should recognize the statehood of Palestinians. This 
would encourage an equal setting for further discussion. Furthermore, the ICRC 
should be granted adequate access to medical supplies in order to maintain 
international health standards within the Occupied Palestinian Territories. This should 
be accompanied by the full support of both Palestinian and Israeli officials. 
Importantly, a review of arrests of civilians should be established. In respect of 
international human rights law, adequate attention needs to be given to the basic 
needs of civilians.  
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6.2.1 Adjusting the Penal Laws of Israel In Order to Respect IHL and IHRL 
 
1. IHL regulating the legal system of occupied territories asserts the notion that 
the legal system of the occupied territory remains intact. This principle reflects 
the temporary nature of occupation, as well as amplifying the role of the 
‘occupier’ as distinct from ‘sovereign’. The lives of those who reside within 
the occupied territory should therefore remain unaltered, and remain as it was 
prior to occupation.
354
 This is clearly stipulated under Art 64(1) of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention, which states that ‘the penal laws of the occupied territory 
shall remain in force’.355 The provision however allows for the ‘suspension’ of 
the penal laws by the occupying power in cases in which the laws constitute a 
threat to security or act as an obstacle in the application of the Convention.
356
 
Art 43 of the Hague Regulations echoes this sentiment.
357
  
 
2. It is therefore apparent that the suspension or repeal of penal laws may only be 
done in three circumstances: for the application of the Convention; for the 
maintenance of order; and for the safety of the occupier.
358
 These conditions 
may not be used in the oppression of the occupied population. Furthermore, 
Art 66 of the Convention provides for three requirements for the functioning 
of military courts. The requirements are as follows: military courts have to be 
properly constituted; non-political; and should be located within the occupied 
territory. It is prefered that the court of appeal be situated within the occupied 
territory.
359
 It therefore stands to reason that the military courts established by 
the occupying power are to enforce the law in areas in which the local courts 
have proven inadequate. The inadequate nature of the local courts in Palestine 
stem from the fact that the salaries of judges and court officials remain 
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modest, which results in the employment of ‘low’ quality employees. Also, 
the required number of employees remains inadequate, and thus renders the 
courts inefficient in dealing with cases promptly.
360
  
 
3. With the objective of the provision of fair trials, IHL seemingly provides for 
the alteration of the legal system of occupied territories with the establishment 
of military courts. However, the use of judges of armed forces who seek 
promotion under the authority of the occupying power brings into question the 
impartiality and independence of the judgments passed by these courts. 
361
 It 
should therefore be understood that these courts be used in exceptional 
circumstances. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Independence 
of Judges and Lawyers has echoed this sentiment, furthermore, asserting that 
in cases in which civilians are being tried it should be understood that 
international law is developing a consensus as to the need to restrict 
drastically, or even prohibit, that practice’. 362 
 
4. Though a few provisions exist relative to the trials under military jurisdiction 
the principle of ‘fair trial’ is notably discussed under the discipline of human 
rights. The general principles of fair trial proceedings are discussed under Art 
14 of the ICCPR
363
 and under Arts 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the UDHR.
364
 Though it is 
understood that the laws that govern international armed conflict is IHL, the 
applicability of human rights law has been addressed. This sentiment is 
emphasised by the Human Rights Committee in its General Comments No’s 
29 (2001) and 31 (2004).
365
 The Committee argues that the ICCPR is 
applicable in international armed conflict, complementarily to IHL; 
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importantly, norms of jus cogens, or customary international law, prohibiting 
derogation from certain rights as stipulated by Art 4 of the ICCPR.
366
 
 
5. Rights that are considered non-derogable include: freedom from torture; 
freedom from slavery; genocide; racial discrimination; crimes against 
humanity; and the right to self-determination.
367
 A state may therefore not 
arbitrarily arrest or detain individuals, and may not presume a person’s guilt 
without providing the right of a person to prove their innocence.
368
 Moreover, 
the issue of torture has been addressed by the CAT. Art 2 specifies that all 
parties to the Convention are to take all necessary steps in preventing acts of 
torture. A ‘state of war’ or ‘threat of war’, according to the CAT, does not 
justify any form of torture.
369
 This emphasises the fact that IHL prevails over 
any general law deemed lex specialis. Human rights law does however remain 
relevant. The provisions of Art 64 and Art 66 concerning the trials of civilians 
in military courts in Occupied Palestinian Territories should be understood as 
prevailing over other rules of human rights. It should therefore be understood 
that beyond the constraints of warfare the doctrine of human rights law is to be 
applied. Thus, in principle, civilians under ‘normal’ circumstances should be 
tried in civil rather than military courts.
370
 
 
6. Importantly, the accession of Palestine as a State Party to the ICC on 1 April 
2015, emphasises the changing nature of the conflict. The ICC Treaty gave the 
Court jurisdiction to investigate crimes dating back to 13 June 2014.
371
 These 
crimes include war crimes and crimes against humanity in or from the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories. The ICC’s jurisdiction will therefore cover 
‘Operation Protective Edge’, consequently shedding light on the extreme 
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situations that both individuals within the Gaza Strip and Israel proper are 
subjected to. Furthermore, the investigation of the ICC may draw attention to 
the continued construction of Israeli settlements within the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories. The latest plan of Israeli settlements that was published 
on 30 January 2015, included the construction of a further 450 units.
372
 The 
status of Palestine as a State Party to the ICC may therefore halt any further 
construction. Though Israel, the USA, and Canada have apposed the accession 
of Palestine as a State Party to the ICC, continued support by the international 
community for the assession may therefore improve transparency of the 
conflict.
373
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